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THE NORMATIVE AND HISTORICAL CASES FOR
PROPORTIONAL DEPORTATION
Angela M. Banks*
ABSTRACT
Is citizenship status a legitimate basis for allocating rights in the United
States?
In immigration law the right to remain in the United States is significantly
tied to citizenship status. Citizens have an absolutely secure right to remain in
the United States regardless of their actions. Noncitizens’ right to remain is
less secure because they can be deported if convicted of specific criminal
offenses. This Article contends that citizenship is not a legitimate basis for
allocating the right to remain. This Article offers normative and historical
arguments for a right to remain for noncitizens. This right should be granted to
members of the society—those with significant connections, commitment, and
obligations to the State. Citizenship status is one proxy for identifying
members, but it can be both under- and over-inclusive. Numerous green card
holders are committed to, have strong connections to, and undertake
obligations to the United States. Deporting these individuals for crimes like
perjury, receipt of stolen property, or failure to appear in court can be
excessively harsh. It can mean depriving “a man and his family of all that
makes life worth while [sic].” Deportation should only be utilized when it is a
proportionate response to criminal activity.
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INTRODUCTION
Gerardo Antonio Mosquera, Sr. was a green card holder in the United
States for twenty-nine years before he was deported to a country where he
barely spoke the language.1 At the age of twenty-nine, after residing in the
United States for almost twenty years, he sold a $10 bag of marijuana to a paid
police informant.2 Gerardo was arrested and he pleaded guilty to the sale and

1

Patrick J. McDonnell, Deportation Shatters Family, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at B1; see also JOSEPH
NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER AND BEYOND: THE WAR ON “ILLEGALS” AND THE REMAKING OF THE U.S.–
MEXICO BOUNDARY 180 (2d ed. 2010). Gerardo immigrated to the United States as a lawful permanent
resident in 1969 from Colombia. McDonnell, supra. He came to the United States with his mother and five
siblings to join his father, who was working as a car dealer. Id.
2 McDonnell, supra note 1.

BANKS GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

6/26/2013 11:35 AM

NORMATIVE AND HISTORICAL CASES

1245

transportation of 0.6 grams of marijuana.3 He was sentenced to ninety days in
jail, three years’ probation, and a $150 fine.4 Gerardo served his sentence and
paid his fine. His crime constituted an aggravated felony under the 1996
reforms to the Immigration and Nationality Act.5 Having an aggravated felony
conviction meant that he was deportable and ineligible for discretionary relief.6
No judge heard about Gerardo’s twenty-nine years of lawful residence in the
United States, his U.S. citizen children and wife, his employment record, or the
hardship that his family would experience if Gerardo were deported.7 There
was no relief available to Gerardo, and he was removed from the United States
in December 1997.8
The outcome of this case would have been very different for someone like
a hypothetical Antoinette. She was born in the United States but raised in
England since the age of two. Her entire family lives in England and
Antoinette has spent no time in the United States since her departure. At the
age of twenty-five she decided to pursue graduate studies in the United States.
If, after being in the United States for one year, Antoinette sold a $10 bag of
marijuana to a paid police informant, she would not be at risk of being
removed to England because she is a U.S. citizen. Pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, her birth in the United States makes her a U.S. citizen.9 She
would only be subject to a criminal sentence similar to what Gerardo faced:
ninety days in jail, three years’ probation, and a $150 fine. Gerardo arguably
has stronger connections to the United States, and thus a stronger liberty
interest in remaining in the United States than Antoinette. Antoinette however
is the one with the right to remain.
In this Article I argue that the right to remain should not depend on
citizenship status. The right to remain should be granted to members of the
society—those with significant connections, commitment, and obligations to
the State. Citizenship status is one proxy for identifying members, but it can be

3

Id.
Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See id. (noting that the revisions subjected noncitizen offenders to deportation regardless of the amount
of illicit drugs sold, whereas previous law allowed offenders to demonstrate countervailing factors such as
strong U.S. family ties). The family depended on Gerardo’s $300-a-week salary, and they were struggling to
survive on his wife Maria’s salary as a school bus driver. See id. Gerardo’s son, Gerardo Anthony Mosquera,
Jr., went into a deep depression after his father’s deportation and killed himself. Id.
8 Id.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4
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both under- and over-inclusive, as demonstrated by Gerardo and Antoinette.
Numerous green card holders, like Gerardo, are committed to, have strong
connections to, and undertake obligations to the United States.10 Deporting
these individuals for crimes like perjury, receipt of stolen property, or failure to
appear in court can be excessively harsh.11 It can mean depriving “a man and
his family of all that makes life worth while [sic].”12 Deportation should only
be utilized when it is a proportionate response to criminal activity. This Article
extends my prior work on proportional deportation. I have previously argued
that the punitive nature of crime-based deportation can give rise to a
substantive due process right to proportionality.13 This Article offers normative
and historical arguments for proportionality in crime-based deportation.
The use of different proxies, such as length of residence, family
connections, or service to local, state, or national communities, can better
ensure that green card holders’ liberty interest in remaining in the United
States is adequately protected.14 This was the approach utilized in the United
States’ first comprehensive crime-based deportation regime, and it can be
utilized today through complex rule-like directives.15

10 This Article focuses on the right to remain for green card holders, also referred to as lawful permanent
residents (LPRs). I leave for another day whether the analysis for other noncitizens, such as unauthorized
migrants, would be the same.
11 See Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651 (2009) (discussing the need
for proportionality in deportation); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1685–88
(2009) (same); Michael J. Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance in U.S. Immigration Policy, 72
U. PITT. L. REV. 431 (2011) (same).
12 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The deportation of
such connected residents is also negatively impacting the health, education, and financial security of American
families. See JONATHAN BAUM, ROSHA JONES & CATHERINE BARRY, IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST? THE
CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING A LAWFUL IMMIGRANT PARENT TO DEPORTATION (2010), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Human_Rights_report.pdf; AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., URBAN INST., FACING
OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2010), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412020_FacingOurFuture_final.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED
APART: FAMILIES SEPARATED AND IMMIGRANTS HARMED BY UNITED STATES DEPORTATION POLICY 4, 51–52,
61–63, 69, 82 (2007); Jacqueline Hagan et al., The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on Immigrant Families
and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1799 (2010).
13 Banks, supra note 11.
14 In this Article I argue that proxies other than citizenship status should be used to identify residents
whose right to remain should be protected. I do not, however, argue that citizens’ right to remain should be
subjected to the same proxies. See infra text accompanying notes 337, 339 for additional discussion of limiting
citizens’ right to remain.
15 See infra Part V.B for a discussion of complex rule-like directives that utilize alternative proxies for
connections, commitment, and obligations to a polity.

BANKS GALLEYSPROOFS1

2013]

6/26/2013 11:35 AM

NORMATIVE AND HISTORICAL CASES

1247

Building on the work of citizenship scholars, I contend that citizenship
status is an under-inclusive proxy for significant connections, commitment,
and obligations to a State.16 Citizenship scholars have explored the meaning of
citizenship in Western democracies and how citizenship rights should be
allocated.17 Many of these scholars have concluded that numerous rights
exclusively allocated to citizens should be accessible to noncitizens through
increased access to citizenship.18 I take a different approach in this Article and
argue that the right to remain should not depend on citizenship status.
This argument proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the current crimebased deportation regime and the harsh consequences it creates for long-term
green card holders and their families. Part II presents a normative argument for
expanding green card holders’ right to remain in the United States. This
argument is based on Ayelet Shachar’s jus nexi framework for identifying
members of a polity and the idea that noncitizens have a liberty interest in
remaining in the United States.19 I contend that deporting members for minor
criminal activity is an illegitimate deprivation of the liberty interest to remain
in the United States because it is disproportionate. Within Part II, I respond to
concerns that my approach to the right to remain may devalue American
citizenship. Part III demonstrates that our first comprehensive post-entry
16 See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (2004);
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 82–93 (2006);
JOSEPH H. CARENS, IMMIGRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO STAY (2010); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); AYELET
SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009); PETER J. SPIRO,
BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Joseph H. Carens, The Case for Amnesty, BOS.
REV., May/June 2009, at 7.
17 See, e.g., BOSNIAK, supra note 16, at 82–93; CARENS, supra note 16; DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS
ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP (1996); CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION 28–30 (2010); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION (1996); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998); SHACHAR, supra note 16; YASEMIN NUHOĞLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF
CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994); SPIRO, supra note 16; Dimitry
Kochenov, Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship Between Status
and Rights, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169, 214–34 (2009); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF
JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 69–81 (2006) (discussing the capabilities approach
to identifying core human entitlements).
18 See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 17; SCHUCK, supra note 17; SHACHAR, supra note 16; William Rogers
Brubaker, Membership Without Citizenship: The Economic and Social Rights of Noncitizens, in IMMIGRATION
AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 145 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989).
These scholars advocate increased access to citizenship for noncitizens rather than extending all of the rights
currently coupled with citizenship status to noncitizens. See, e.g., Brubaker, supra.
19 See SHACHAR, supra note 16, at 16.
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crime-based deportation regime was rooted in the proportionality principle.
Part IV argues that reliance on the foundational norms of our crime-based
deportation regime—connection and proportionality—has diminished and
must be restored in order to have a more just deportation regime. Part V
contends that citizenship status is an under- and over-inclusive proxy for
membership that leaves numerous noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in
the United States inadequately protected. I conclude that in order to achieve
this goal the right to remain cannot depend on citizenship status.
I. CRIME-BASED DEPORTATION
Citizenship status has become increasingly important in protecting an
individual’s liberty interest in remaining in the United States. United States
citizens have an absolutely secure right to remain within the territorial
boundaries of the United States.20 Green card holders, technically referred to as
lawful permanent residents (LPRs), have a relatively secure right to remain
within the territorial boundaries of the United States after being admitted.21
This right is not absolutely secure because it is subject to certain conditions.
LPRs can be removed from the United States based on the deportation grounds
provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). All noncitizens,
including LPRs, are deportable for violating immigration rules and engaging in
a variety of criminal activities.22 One of the most important crime-based
deportation grounds is conviction of an aggravated felony.23 In addition to
being deportable, an individual with an aggravated felony conviction is
generally ineligible for discretionary relief from deportation, prohibited from
returning to the United States, eligible for expedited removal proceedings, and
subject to mandatory detention while in removal proceedings.24
20

SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 167.
See id.
22 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012). See infra text accompanying notes 262–66 for details regarding the number
of noncitizens deported based on criminal activity and the type of criminal activity.
23 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (stating “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time
after admission is deportable”).
24 Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A) (stating aggravated felons are inadmissible forever); id. § 1226(c)(1) (mandating
detention during removal proceedings for aggravated felons); id. § 1228(a)(3) (providing for expedited
proceedings); id. § 1229b(a)–(b) (making aggravated felons ineligible for cancellation of removal); id.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B) (limiting access to withholding of removal).
Individuals with an aggravated felony conviction are ineligible for Section 240A(a) cancellation of
removal. Id. § 1229b(a). Individuals are ineligible for Section 240A(b) relief if they do not have good moral
character, id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), and Section 101(f) precludes the Attorney General from finding that an
individual with an aggravated felony conviction has good moral character. Id. § 1101(f). Withholding of
removal is generally available if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be
21
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Individuals like Gerardo face these possibilities.25 If aggravated felonies
were crimes that were aggravated and felonies, then this outcome could be a
proportionate response to criminal activity. The definition, however, is much
broader. Aggravated felony is a term of art defined in the INA, and it can
include state misdemeanors.26 The term was introduced in 1988 and it was
originally limited to the serious crimes of murder, drug trafficking, and illicit
trafficking in firearms and destructive devices.27 In the 1990s Congress
significantly expanded the aggravated felony definition. Initial expansions used
length of prison sentence to differentiate more serious crimes from less serious
crimes. For example, a theft offense or crime of violence was only an
aggravated felony if there was an imposed sentence of at least five years.28 The
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) reduced that sentence to at least one year.29 The IIRIRA and other
immigration reforms also added additional crimes to the aggravated felony

threatened because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. Id. § 1231(b)(3)(A). However, this relief is not available if the alien has been convicted “of a
particularly serious crime [and thus] is a danger to the community of the United States.” Id.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Individuals with aggravated felony convictions fall into both of these categories. See id.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B).
An exception to this is the availability of a Section 212(h) waiver. This waiver is available for
individuals with an aggravated felony conviction if they are not a lawful permanent resident. Id. § 1182(h)(2).
Section 212(h) waives specific crime-based inadmissibility grounds and can be relevant in deportation
proceedings when an individual is seeking to adjust from nonimmigrant to immigrant status. The Attorney
General can grant this form of discretionary relief if deportation will result in “extreme hardship to the United
States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien.” Id. § 1182(h)(1)(B).
25 Gerardo was prohibited from returning to the United States for his son’s funeral. McDonnell, supra
note 1. Section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the INA prohibited his return and he was not granted a waiver. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i); McDonnell, supra note 1.
26 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws
and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000).
27 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70 (current version
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
28 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416,
§ 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
29 Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -28 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). For example, a noncitizen with a shoplifting conviction who obtained a one-year
suspended sentence has an aggravated felony conviction even if the crime would be considered a state
misdemeanor. See Morawetz, supra note 26, at 1939, 1942. This outcome is due to the expanded definition of
an aggravated felony and the new definition of a term of imprisonment adopted in IIRIRA. See id. at 1939
n.16. A term of imprisonment now includes the period of time ordered by the court regardless of any time
suspended or time actually served. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48). This further minimizes the usefulness of the
imposed sentence as a proxy for seriousness.
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definition like perjury and obstruction of justice.30 A significant number of
noncitizens are subject to deportation based on an aggravated felony
conviction not only because of the expanding definition, but also because of
the retroactive application of this definition.31 Congress made the definition
retroactive to facilitate administrative efficiency.32 Consequently long-term
LPRs can be deported based on pre-1996 criminal activity that was not a
deportable offense at the time the crime was committed.33
Citizens like Antoinette avoid all of these consequences, but noncitizens
like Gerardo face deportation without any opportunity to have their
connections and contributions to the United States considered.34 Deportation is
the guaranteed response to an aggravated felony conviction for most

30 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat.
1214, 1277–78 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). The definition of an aggravated felony was
expanded several times between 1988 and 1996. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act § 321; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(e); Immigration and
Nationality Technical Corrections Act § 222(a); Immigration Act of 1990 § 501.
31 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 31.
32 See id. at 32. Without retroactivity federal immigration authorities would have to determine which
aggravated felony definition applied to which noncitizens. Id. This additional step in determining deportability
was predicted to require significant administrative resources and retroactivity eliminated this problem. See id.
at 31–32.
33 Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 97, 106–18 (1998) [hereinafter Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation]; Morawetz, supra note
26, at 1936–37. One might contend that LPRs should realize that their ability to reside in the United States
could be threatened if they engage in criminal activity. While the 1996 reforms may have added new
retroactive deportation grounds, all they did was make a broader range of criminal activity the basis for
deportation. Thus the general security of LPRs residence rights remained unchanged. This would be a
reasonable conclusion if it were reasonable to assume that any criminal activity constitutes a serious threat to
public safety or national security. The crime-based deportation grounds before 1996, particularly the definition
of an aggravated felony, were designed to remove noncitizens who engaged in criminal activity that was
serious and threatened public safety. See infra text accompanying note 264. Congressional discussions and
debates surrounding the 1996 reforms emphasized this as the justification for crime-based deportation grounds.
See infra text accompanying note 264. Thus it would not be reasonable for LPRs to conclude that any criminal
activity (e.g., jaywalking or speeding) would be serious enough to constitute a serious threat to public safety or
national security. It would be reasonable for LPRs to believe that serious crimes like murder, rape, drug
trafficking, or sexual abuse of a minor would be the type of criminal activity giving rise to deportation. Yet the
1996 reforms included a much broader range of criminal activity. Not only is the purchase of a $10 bag of
marijuana now a deportable offense, so is perjury and receipt of stolen property. See supra text accompanying
notes 29–30. LPRs should not get a pass for this activity. They, like citizens, should be subject to the
punishments provided for within the criminal justice system. Deportation, however, should be limited to the
instances in which it would be proportionate.
34 Gerardo was not eligible for a Section 212(h) waiver because his aggravated felony was committed
after his admission as an LPR. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
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noncitizens.35 This is a departure from the system that existed before 1996.
Between 1917, when Congress enacted the first comprehensive post-entry
crime-based deportation regime, and 1996, a noncitizen’s connections to the
polity, rather than citizenship status, were determinative of his or her ability to
remain in the United States after a criminal conviction.36
The expansion of the aggravated felony definition to include crimes like
perjury and receipt of stolen property has made noncitizens deportable for a
wide range of criminal activity. What makes the current system particularly
harsh is that those with aggravated felony convictions are generally ineligible
for discretionary relief. Once found guilty of an aggravated felony, deportation
is a near certainty. This approach to crime and deportation ignores the various
liberty interests that noncitizens can have in remaining in the United States and
it allows for disproportionate outcomes.
II. JUS NEXI AND A RIGHT TO REMAIN
The jus nexi principle provides a basis for noncitizens, specifically green
card holders, to be recognized as members of the United States polity.37
Membership status within the polity strengthens these individuals’ liberty
interest in remaining in the United States. Deportation infringes upon this
interest and should only be done when it is a proportionate response to an
immigrant’s activities in the United States. This Part begins by laying out the
jus nexi principle and then demonstrates the significant role that this principle
had in protecting noncitizens’ right to remain in the United States. Some may
contend that this approach to the right to remain devalues citizenship. The final
section of this Part responds to that critique.

35 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010); Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive
Deportation, supra note 33, at 121.
36 Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation, supra note 33, at 107–10; see infra text accompanying
notes 116–17. Post-entry-conduct deportation grounds are deportation grounds that focus on the activity of
noncitizens after they have been admitted to the United States. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION
NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 6 (2007). The most common post-entry-conduct grounds are
based on criminal convictions in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). These deportation grounds are
contrasted with what Daniel Kanstroom refers to as “extended border control” deportation grounds. See
KANSTROOM, supra, at 5–6. These deportation grounds require the deportation of individuals who should
never have been admitted or who have violated the terms of their admission. See id. at 5.
37 SHACHAR, supra note 16, at 164–66.
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A. Jus Nexi
1. The Connection Principle
Ayelet Shachar has argued that citizenship should be available based on the
jus nexi principle in addition to, or instead of, the jus sanguinis and jus soli
principles.38 The jus nexi principle supports allocating citizenship based on an
individual’s genuine connection to a polity rather than a bloodline connection
to the State or birth within the State’s territory.39 Within this framework
political membership is conveyed based on “connection, union, or linkage” to
the state of residence.40 The emphasis is on the “social fact of membership.”41
The social fact of membership is evident when an individual has a “genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence
of reciprocal rights and duties” with a specific state.42 This can be said to exist
when “an individual’s long-term circumstances of life . . . link her own wellbeing to a particular polity.”43
Shachar’s jus nexi principle draws on “the growing acceptance of the
genuine-connection criterion in court decisions, regulatory regimes, and
academic commentaries.”44 For example, in 1955 the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) adopted a “functional, genuine-connection” test to determine
whether to give international effect to a naturalized citizen’s new citizenship.45
In the Nottebohm Case, a German citizen resided in Guatemala for the
majority of his adult life, but was naturalized and became a citizen of
Liechtenstein in 1939.46 Guatemala refused to recognize Nottebohm as a
citizen of Liechtenstein because he had minimal connections to
Liechtenstein.47 His habitual residence had remained in Guatemala, as did his

38

See id. at 165. The jus soli principle extends citizenship based on birth within the territory. Id. at 7. The
jus sanguinis principle extends citizenship based on having a blood relative who is a citizen. Id.
39 Id. at 16.
40 Id. at 16, 165.
41 Id. at 165 (emphasis omitted).
42 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).
43 Rainer Bauböck, Stakeholder Citizenship and Democratic Participation in Migration Contexts, in THE
TIES THAT BIND: ACCOMMODATING DIVERSITY IN CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 105, 111 (John Erik
Fossum et al. eds., 2009).
44 SHACHAR, supra note 16, at 165.
45 Id. at 166; see also Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 22–23 (establishing the functional, genuineconnection test).
46 Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 13.
47 Id. at 19.
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business activities and some of his family ties.48 The ICJ concluded that
citizenship “constitute[s] the juridical expression of the fact that the individual
upon whom it is conferred . . . is in fact more closely connected with the
population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other
State.”49
While Shachar uses the jus nexi principle to advocate for increased access
to citizenship, I however contend that this principle also supports recognition
of something less than citizenship—the right to remain.50 The jus nexi
principle provides a basis for identifying members of a polity. Rather than
identifying members based on formal status, the jus nexi principle allows those
with “real and substantive ties” to a polity to be recognized as members
entitled to certain rights and protections.51 It is my contention that individuals
with these “real and substantive ties” have a strong liberty interest in remaining
in the United States.52
Within U.S. law, immigration-related rights have been extended to
noncitizens based on the jus nexi principle. Hiroshi Motomura’s notion of
“immigration as affiliation” captures this perspective.53 “This is the view that
the treatment of lawful immigrants and other noncitizens should depend on the
ties that they have formed in this country.”54 Noncitizens’ connections have
been relevant in determining who is eligible for deportation, who is actually
deported, who can be admitted to the United States, and who is seeking
admission. For example, length of residence has been used to define who
within the noncitizen population is deportable.55 Certain deportation grounds,
like a crime-involving-moral-turpitude conviction, only apply within the first
five years of admission.56 A statute of limitations is essentially created that
exempts long-term residents from the deportation ground.57 Favorable grants
48

Id. at 13, 19.
Id. at 23.
50 I believe that the jus nexi principle provides a basis for citizenship, but I do not think that citizenship
status is necessary to protect certain noncitizens’ right to remain in the United States.
51 SHACHAR, supra note 16, at 166.
52 See id. See infra Part II.A.2 for further discussion of noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in the
United States.
53 MOTOMURA, supra note 16, at 10–12.
54 Id. at 11.
55 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (declaring an alien deportable based, in part, on a
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or ten years for an alien having
lawful permanent resident status) after admission).
56 Id.
57 Id. § 1227.
49
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of discretionary relief from deportation have also depended on length of
residence, family ties, employment history, property ownership, business
connections, and service in the U.S. Armed Forces.58 Additionally certain
admission categories are based on family connections to the United States, and
connections more generally have been used to determine whether or not a
noncitizen is seeking admission.59
Noncitizens’ connections to the United States are also based on their
obligations to the polity. For example, territorial presence gives rise to an
obligation for all noncitizens to pay taxes and abide by state and federal law.60
Male noncitizens have an additional obligation of registering with the Selective
Service (the draft).61
The Supreme Court has utilized the jus nexi principle to allocate rights to
noncitizens in the immigration context. The various connections and
responsibilities that noncitizens develop in the United States have played a role
in determining what rights noncitizens have in the immigration context and
how those rights will be protected. For example, the Court has repeatedly held
that noncitizens physically present in the United States or returning to the
United States have greater due process rights than noncitizens at the border
seeking admission for the first time.62 This has occurred despite the Court’s
insistence that admission and residence in the United States are privileges for

58 See, e.g., In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581,
584–85 (B.I.A. 1978)); Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 489, 508–09 (2011).
59 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court had to determine whether a returning LPR was seeking
admission. E.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 22–23 (1982); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 450–53
(1963); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 591–92 (1953). If the LPR was seeking admission, he or
she would be subject to the exclusion grounds and receive less procedural protection. See Plasencia, 459 U.S.
at 25–27. If the LPR was not seeking admission, he or she would not have to contend with the exclusion
grounds and would be admitted to the United States. See id. In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, Rosenberg v.
Fleuti, and Landon v. Plasencia, the returning LPRs had potentially engaged in activity since their initial
admission that would make them inadmissible. Id. at 23–24; Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 450–51; Colding, 344
U.S. at 594–95. Thus, if the exclusion grounds applied, they would be denied the ability to return to their life
in the United States. In each of these cases, the fact that the noncitizens were LPRs and had resided in the
United States for significant periods of time influenced the Court’s analysis. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–34;
Rosenberg, 374 U.S. at 460–61; Colding, 344 U.S. at 592.
60 Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract Framework, 84 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1403, 1410 (2009).
61 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 3, 62 Stat. 604, 605.
62 See, e.g., Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–33; Colding, 344 U.S. at 596–98; United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544–47 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86,
101 (1903). But see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212–15 (1953).
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noncitizens.63 The jus nexi principle helps to explain the additional protections
for present and returning noncitizens.
Membership within a polity is a proxy for determining who is so connected
to the polity that deportation would be an excessively harsh consequence.
Deportation often deprives noncitizens of the ability to reside in the place that
they know as home. As Justice Douglas explained:
[Deportation] is punishment in the practical sense. It may deprive a
man and his family of all that makes life worth while [sic]. Those
who have their roots here have an important stake in this country.
Their plans for themselves and their hopes for their children all
depend on their right to stay. If they are uprooted and sent to lands no
longer known to them, no longer hospitable, they become displaced,
64
homeless people condemned to bitterness and despair.

Joseph Carens echoed this sentiment when he wrote that “there is something
deeply wrong in forcing people to leave a place where they have lived for a
long time.”65 This is because:
Most people form their deepest human connections where they live—
it becomes home. Even if someone has arrived only as an adult, it
seems cruel and inhumane to uproot a person who has spent fifteen or
twenty years as a contributing member of society in the name of
66
enforcing immigration restrictions.

While Carens focuses on deporting unauthorized migrants, his comments about
connection and membership apply to all noncitizens. Deportation for
nonmembers may be disruptive and dash hopes for a different or better life, but
it does not deprive them of their home as it does for members.
Historically, the right to reside within a particular community has been tied
to one’s membership status within the community.67 Members could not be
banished or exiled from their community, but nonmembers could be.68
Throughout U.S. history different criteria have been used to define members,
including economic status, adherence to local rules and customs, and length of
stay within the community.69 During the mid-nineteenth century, U.S. states
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
CARENS, supra note 16, at 12.
Id.
See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 123–43.
Id.
Id.
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began prohibiting banishment and exile as a form of punishment in state
constitutions.70 The state legislatures concluded that the comity costs of
banishment and exile were too high to maintain the practice.71 Comity does not
raise the same concerns in the international context, and by 1917 the federal
government was willing to banish or exile noncitizens based on post-entry
conduct.72 Yet Congress was not willing to banish “our” criminals because it
was viewed as a disproportionate response to criminal activity.73 Congressional
discussions about who is one of “ours” focused on factors related to the jus
nexi principle.74
Scholars such as Professors Cox and Posner have critiqued a membership
approach to allocating immigration-related rights.75 Rather than focusing on
membership status, Cox and Posner have contended that rights should be
allocated based on an examination of migrants’ reasons for entering a state and
the state’s interest in having individuals migrate and remain.76 In the context of
deportation, Cox and Posner identified flexibility as an important state
interest.77 Flexibility ensures that the State can terminate the residence of
noncitizens “any time events change such that the benefits from the migrant’s
presence no longer exceed the costs.”78 Granting the State maximum
70 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 30; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 21; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 21; ILL.
CONST. art I, § 11; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 12 (amended 1972); MD. CONST. art. XXIV; MASS. CONST.
pt. 1, art. XII; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; OHIO CONST. art. I,
§ 12; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 29; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 20; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 21;
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5. The banishment and exile prohibited was interstate. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II,
§ 21. Intrastate banishment has been held to be constitutional under some of these state constitutions. E.g.,
State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 472, 474 (Ga. 1974).
71 Cf. Wm. Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposal for Its Abolition Under the
First Amendment, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 466 (1998) (discussing comity as a
justification for eliminating banishment). Banishment is, however, used intrastate as a condition of release for
sex offenders. See, e.g., Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders from the
State of Georgia: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513 (2007); Amber Leigh Bagley,
Comment, “An Era of Human Zoning”: Banishing Sex Offenders from Communities Through Residence and
Work Restrictions, 57 EMORY L.J. 1347 (2008).
72 See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90.
73 See 42 CONG. REC. 2723, 2752–53 (1908). In 1916, Representative Riley J. Wilson said that an
immigrant who comes “with a good record, with good purposes and good intentions, and makes good when he
arrives here” should not be deported based on post-entry criminal activity because that immigrant “might be
our criminal, and it might not be just fair to deport him.” Restriction of Immigration: Hearing on H.R. 10384
Before the H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization, 64th Cong. 15 (1916) [hereinafter 1916 Hearings]
(statement of Rep. Riley J. Wilson, Member, H. Comm. on Immigration & Naturalization).
74 See infra Parts II.B and IV.C.
75 Cox & Posner, supra note 60, at 1407–09.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1407–08.
78 Id. at 1407.
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flexibility, however, could be counterproductive.79 If migrants fear that they
can be removed relatively easily, they are unlikely to make the countryspecific investments that would enable them to succeed and that make
immigration beneficial for the State.80 Thus Cox and Posner concluded that the
optimal migration contract will balance the State’s interest in flexibility with
the noncitizens’ interest in limiting the State’s deportation power.81
Cox and Posner have contended that this approach to immigrant rights
provides a wider range of rights and opportunities than a lock-step membership
approach.82 While the approach offered in this Article focuses on membership
as the basis for allocating rights, it does not articulate a lock-step approach.
The right to remain is protected based on a variety of factors in order to allow a
variety of outcomes. Green card holders’ connections, commitment, and
obligations to the United States, in addition to the crime committed, are
evaluated to determine if deportation would be proportionate. The emphasis on
proportionality grants green card holders the assurances they need and the
flexibility the government desires. This approach ensures green card holders
that if they make the effort to socially, culturally, and economically integrate
into U.S. society they cannot be easily removed. This approach also grants the
government sufficient flexibility to remove individuals in the specific cases in
which removal is necessary.
2. A Liberty Interest in Remaining
The right to remain is based on an individual’s liberty interest in remaining
in his state of residence. The U.S. Constitution ensures that no person shall be
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”83 Thus all
persons’ liberty interests are protected under U.S. law. Yet membership plays a
decisive role in determining whether an individual has been legitimately
deprived of her liberty interest in remaining in the United States after a
criminal conviction.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a resident noncitizen’s
liberty interest in remaining in the United States in 1903 in Yamataya v.
79

Id. at 1407–08.
Id. Country-specific investments include learning the local language and developing social networks.
Id. at 1407.
81 Id. at 1408 (arguing that this balance can be achieved “by granting migrants more or less generous
rights and by making it harder or easier for the government to change those rights”).
82 Id. at 1408–09.
83 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
80
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Fisher.84 Kaoru Yamataya entered the United States on July 11, 1901.85 Four
days after her admission, an immigration inspector concluded that she entered
the United States in violation of law because she was a “pauper and a person
likely to become a public charge.”86 The Secretary of the Treasury ordered that
she be taken into custody and deported to Japan.87 Yamataya contested the
deportation order arguing that she had been deprived of liberty without due
process of law.88 The Court recognized that “no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in
respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends.”89 Deporting a
noncitizen “who has entered the country, and has become subject in all
respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be
illegally here” implicates a liberty interest.90 Before a noncitizen can be
deprived of this liberty interest, he or she must be given “all opportunity to be
heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United
States.”91 In Bridges v. Wixon a noncitizen challenged his deportation order.92
The Court explicitly stated that “the liberty of an individual is at stake” in
deportation cases.93 Echoing a similar sentiment seven years later, Justice

84 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). The Court has been willing to police the procedures used when liberty
interests are infringed upon, but not the substantive decisions implicating liberty interests. See id. at 100
(“Leaving on one side the question whether an alien can rightfully invoke the due process clause of the
Constitution . . . we have to say that the rigid construction of the acts of Congress suggested by the appellant
are not justified.”).
85 Id. at 87.
86 Id. The Court’s recognition of a noncitizen’s liberty interest in remaining in the United States marked
an important departure from its 1893 conclusion that a State’s power to deport noncitizens is “absolute and
unqualified.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). In Fong Yue Ting, the Court
concluded that international law provided no limits on a State’s power to deport noncitizens and did not
recognize any individual interests at stake for deportation. Id. at 708. The Court did acknowledge that the U.S.
Constitution could provide limits, but concluded that the power to deport had been allocated to the political
branches of government and the courts would not police the substantive basis for deportation decisions. Id. at
711–13.
87 Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 87.
88 See id. at 87–88.
89 Id. at 101.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
93 Id. at 154. Bridges was ordered deported for being affiliated with the Communist Party, and the Court
held that the government misapplied this deportation ground. Id. at 156–57. The Court stated that due to the
liberty interest at stake with deportation, “[m]eticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which [the
immigrant] is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.” Id. at 154. While the Court
has not always required robust procedural guarantees protecting this liberty interest, the Court has consistently
recognized that deportation affects noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in the United States. In Galvan v.
Press, the Court noted:
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Douglas stated that he “would stay the hand of the Government and let those to
whom we have extended our hospitality and who have become members of our
communities remain here and enjoy the life and liberty which the Constitution
guarantees.”94
While recognizing noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in the United
States, Justice Douglas acknowledged that there were limits. He could imagine
certain noncitizen activities endangering public welfare such that deportation
would be appropriate regardless of length of residence.95 He invoked the
proportionality principle to strike the appropriate balance. I similarly contend
that recognizing that noncitizens have a liberty interest in remaining in the
United States does not mean that they could not be deported under any
circumstances. Individuals have a variety of interests, but they are not absolute.
Individual interests and state interests have to be balanced against one another.
For example, when an individual has been convicted of a crime she can be sent
to prison. Imprisonment infringes on an individual’s liberty interest, yet it is
permitted in light of the State’s interest in protecting public safety. Yet the
State is limited in how it can punish because constitutional provisions protect
against disproportionate or excessive punishment.
The Court has not evaluated whether deportation is a disproportionate or
excessive punishment because it held in 1893 that deportation is not
punishment.96 I have previously critiqued the Court’s continued reliance on
this conclusion in the face of changing deportation grounds.97 In 1893,

[C]onsidering what it means to deport an alien who legally became part of the American
community, and the extent to which, since he is a ‘person,’ an alien has the same protection for
his life, liberty and property under the Due Process Clause as is afforded to a citizen, deportation
without permitting the alien to prove that he was unaware of the Communist Party’s advocacy of
violence strikes one with a sense of harsh incongruity.
347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
Recognizing the liberty interests implicated by deportation is the basis for the Court requiring that
deportation proceedings adhere to constitutional due process requirements. See Hiroshi Motomura, The
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992). Since Yamataya, the Court has provided robust judicial review of claims
alleging that deportation proceedings violate procedural due process. See BOSNIAK, supra note 16, at 51.
94 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 601 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
95 Id. (noting that there could be “occasions when the continued presence of an alien, no matter how long
he may have been here, would be hostile to the safety or welfare of the Nation due to the nature of his
conduct”).
96 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709, 730 (1893).
97 Banks, supra note 11, at 1659–63.
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deportation was used to rectify admissions mistakes.98 It was not until 1917
that Congress enacted a comprehensive regime whereby post-entry criminal
activity was the basis for deportation.99 The Supreme Court has recently
recognized the punitive nature of such deportation in Padilla v. Kentucky.100 In
this case the Court acknowledged that “deportation is an integral part—indeed,
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”101
While there is a growing judicial awareness of the punitive nature of
deportation, the Court has recognized the liberty interests at stake with
deportation since 1903. The jus nexi principle assists in determining when
deportation is disproportionate and thus an illegitimate deprivation of that
liberty interest.
B. The Historical Case
In 1917 Congress considered noncitizen connections to the polity relevant
in determining who would be deportable based on post-entry criminal activity.
Length of residence within the United States and citizenship were the two
factors most commonly discussed.102 This section demonstrates how Congress
reached a consensus in 1917 that eligibility for deportation should be based on
the jus nexi principle rather than citizenship status.
Some members of Congress argued that foreign-born residents should be
deportable based on post-entry conduct until the time that they became
citizens.103 Others were concerned that citizenship was an under-inclusive
98

Id. at 1651.
KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 133.
100 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
101 Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted).
102 Aaron Levy of the National Liberal Immigration League remarked that “it is a difficult question to
determine just what is the right limit to impose.” Hearing Relative to the Dillingham Bill, S. 3175, to Regulate
the Immigration of Aliens to and the Residence of Aliens in the United States: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Immigration & Naturalization, 62nd Cong. 44 (1912) [hereinafter 1912 Hearings].
103 An interesting constitutional concern raised during the debates was whether Congress had the authority
to deport a noncitizen regardless of how long he or she had resided in the United States. In 1916, the provision
before the House required the criminal conviction to be based on an act committed within five years of entry.
53 CONG. REC. 5165 (1916). Representative Bennet explained that the House Immigration and Naturalization
Committee chose five years because it was concerned that deportation based on a criminal act any time after
admission would be unconstitutional. Id. Basing his concerns on a Supreme Court opinion, he stated that
Justice Holmes had intimated that “you could not provide that an alien could be deported at any time; that
there had to be a limit, and that the length of time for deportation was analogous to the time in which a person
could be naturalized.” Id. Representative Bennet was quickly corrected by Representatives Burnett and Sabath.
99
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proxy for membership and that length of residence in the United States better
identified members entitled to remain. Proponents of crime-based deportation
thought that if an immigrant naturalized then “he takes his chance with the rest
of us, but until he assumes the responsibilities of citizenship with the rest of us,
he should be subject to deportation if he shows that he is not the kind of man
we want here.”104 For Arthur Woods, the police commissioner of New York
City, membership categories less than citizen did not entail the same level of
responsibilities, and thus should not support a right to remain.105 This idea was
shared by Representative Bennet of New York who introduced the bills in
1908, 1910, and 1911 providing for post-entry crime-based deportation.106
Representative Bennet’s proposals would have made all noncitizens deportable
if convicted of a serious crime.107 It did not matter how long the noncitizen had
resided in the United States, what connections he or she had, or what impact
deportation would have on United States interests. These proposals were not
enacted because a congressional consensus developed that some noncitizens
were “ours” even though they had not naturalized.108
In 1917 the jus nexi principle was operationalized as length of residence in
the United States. Noncitizens were only deportable for a crime involving
moral turpitude within the first five years of admission.109 Congress presumed
that noncitizens developed a genuine connection to the United States in five
years.110 Deportation for a single conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude after five years was viewed as disproportionate.111 Congress reached
a different conclusion regarding the proportionality of deporting long-term

Id. at 5165–68. Representative Burnett informed the House that the case referred to by Representative Bennet
had been overruled in 1914. Id. at 5165 (referencing Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914)). Representative
Sabath reminded the House that existing law provided for the deportation of noncitizens engaging in
prostitution any time after their admission to the United States. Id. at 5168. This law had been found
constitutional and was used to deport 214 prostitutes and procurers by the end of the 1915 fiscal year. Id.
104 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 12 (statement of Arthur Woods, Police Comm’r of New York City).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 13.
107 See 42 CONG. REC. 2752 (1908).
108 See 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 13–14 (statement of Rep. Adolph J. Sabath, Member, H. Comm.
on Immigration & Naturalization) (“A great many people who have been here a great many years can not [sic]
due to unfortunate conditions that exist, become citizens. Meanwhile they might have been married; they
might have an American wife, a woman who has been born here, and they might have two or three children.”).
109 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. The Immigration Act of 1917 made postentry criminal activity deportable by making noncitizens with a crime-involving-moral-turpitude conviction
deportable. See infra Part III.B.
110 53 CONG. REC. 5165–72 (1916).
111 Id.
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residents for prostitution-related crimes and multiple convictions for crimes
involving moral turpitude.112
Time provides for the development of connections. If a noncitizen engaged
in criminal activity after developing the connections that give rise to
membership, Representative Wilson of Louisiana concluded that the United
States would have to take responsibility for that. He said:
Now, I agree with the chairman that the man who may come here
with a good record, with good purposes and good intentions, and
makes good when he arrives here, owing to the fact that our
atmosphere is not so perfect as it might be and his associates might
not be of the best, might not be entirely responsible for the
commission of a crime. I feel as if he might be our criminal, and it
113
might not be just fair to deport him.

Representative Burnett of Alabama agreed with this perspective, and the House
Committee on Immigration did not take Commissioner Woods’s
recommendation to provide for deportation any time before naturalization.114
Five years came to represent the probationary period for becoming part of the
American community. One needed to reside in the United States for five years
to become a U.S. citizen, and after residing in the United States for five years
one could not be deported based on a crime involving moral turpitude.115
In 1917, Congress decided that the right to remain should extend to those
who were members of the polity based on the social facts of their lives.116 The
112 Prostitution-related crimes became deportation grounds in 1907. KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 125.
This and the subsequent prostitution-related deportation grounds were aimed at rectifying admission mistakes.
Prostitutes were ineligible for admission and the deportation grounds provided for their removal if they were
mistakenly admitted to the United States. Id. Initially there was a three-year statute of limitations but
immigration officers found it difficult to accurately determine a noncitizen’s entry date. Id. Women could
avoid deportation by claiming admission more than three years prior. Id. at 125–26. The statute of limitations
was removed to address this problem. Id. Individuals with multiple crimes-involving-moral-turpitude
convictions were viewed as recidivists and their deportation was deemed proportionate regardless of their
connections to the United States. 53 CONG. REC. 5169 (1916).
113 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 15 (emphasis added).
114 The provisions for anarchists and prostitutes are an exception. Noncitizens could be deported for these
actions any time after admission. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889.
115 Representative Sabath attempted to change the five-year period to three years in 1916. 53 CONG. REC.
5169 (1916). He seemed to believe that genuine connections to the United States developed before five years.
See id. Representative Burnett responded by noting that the provisions for judicial recommendation against
deportation would mitigate any harshness. Id.
116 MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 59
(2004) (noting that the use of statutes of limitations for deportation grounds reflected “the general philosophy
of the melting pot: it seemed unconscionable to expel immigrants after they had settled in the country and had
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social fact of membership for noncitizens was determined by examining the
connections that an immigrant had to the United States.117 Between 1917 and
1996, factors such as length of residence, military service, community service,
family ties, community connections, property ownership, and business
connections to the polity were used to identify members.118 Members were
seen to have a heightened liberty interest in remaining in the United States, and
this interest was protected through statutes of limitations and access to
discretionary relief.
Congressional conclusions about the proportionality of deportation varied
between 1917 and 1996. As concerns about national security increased,
Congress became less concerned that deportation would be a disproportionate
response.119 For example, the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act added
numerous new deportation grounds.120 Many of the additions reflected the
United States’ embroilment in the Cold War and deep concerns about national
security. Noncitizens were deportable for being members of the Communist
Party of the United States or advocating communism, failing to comply with
various provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, and
engaging in activities prejudicial to the public interest.121 Of the new
deportation grounds, only two included a statute of limitations—alien
smuggling and failure to comply with Title I of the Alien Registration Act.122
The same trend is evident with the 1996 reforms. At that time, Congress
viewed unauthorized migration and violent drug crimes as serious enough to
warrant deportation regardless of a noncitizen’s social membership. There also
begun to assimilate”); see also id. at 75 (explaining that unauthorized European immigrants in the late 1920s
and 1930s “were accepted as members of society” and deporting them “struck many as simply unjust” because
it “caused hardship and suffering to these immigrants and their families”).
117 Another factor that was implicitly considered was race and ethnicity. Historian Mae Ngai has
documented the role of race and ethnicity in perceptions about which immigrants were accepted as members of
society. She notes that Mexican migrants were less likely to be viewed as members of American society
despite long-term residence and family ties. Id. at 75, 82. The role of race and ethnicity in shaping ideas about
membership in American society is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article focuses on the idea that
noncitizens could be considered members of American society despite their lack of citizenship status.
118 See, e.g., In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581,
584–85 (B.I.A. 1978)).
119 With the adoption of each law, more and more noncitizens were deportable. While connection became
less relevant in defining who was deportable, it remained important in deciding which noncitizens actually got
deported until 1996.
120 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 241(a), 66 Stat. 163, 204–08 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1227 (2012)).
121 Id. § 241(a)(6)(C)–(E), (7). Other additions dealt with general criminal matters like convictions related
to firearms and narcotics and immigration-related crimes like alien smuggling. Id. § 241(a)(11), (13), (14).
122 Id. § 241(a)(13), (15) (providing a five-year statute of limitations).
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seemed to be some presumption that unauthorized migrants have few
meaningful connections to or within the United States to give rise to social
membership.
Between 1917 and 1996, the jus nexi principle played an important role in
determining which noncitizens were considered members and thus not subject
to post-entry crime-based deportation grounds. Over time concerns about
national security and public safety have shifted congressional concerns about
who is a member, yet the jus nexi principle has not been abandoned.
C. Devaluing Citizenship?
The conception of membership articulated in this Article is based on
connections, commitment, and obligation to the state of residence rather than
legal status. Scholars such as Peter Schuck and David Jacobson have argued
that the decreasing relevance of citizenship status for legal rights and economic
opportunities devalues citizenship.123 The lack of significant distinction
between green card holders and citizens reduces LPRs’ incentive to naturalize
and “alter[s] the social significance of citizenship.”124 Professor Schuck has
identified four dangers associated with devalued American citizenship.125 The
first is compromising effective governance.126 By having a large population of
noncitizens who are unable to vote, government officials have little incentive
to identify and respond to the claims of noncitizens.127 This creates a situation
in which “the gap between power and accountability widens and the potential
for exploiting non-citizens grows.”128 The second danger is related to cultural
assimilation.129 In pursuit of naturalization, noncitizens learn English, civics,
and American history.130 Absent an incentive to naturalize, noncitizens may
not develop these skills, which are necessary for their incorporation within
American society and the effective functioning of the United States.131
Professor Schuck’s third danger is that a devaluation of American citizenship
123 SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 163 (“United States citizenship . . . confers few legal or economic
advantages over the status of permanent resident alien.”); cf. JACOBSON, supra note 17, at 40 (focusing on
Western European, and particularly German, experiences).
124 SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 163–64.
125 Id. at 171–72.
126 Id. at 171.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See id. at 171–72; see also JACOBSON, supra note 17, at 40 (discussing similar concerns in France).
130 See SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 172 (noting that citizenship requires “mastery of language and social
knowledge”).
131 Id. at 171–72.
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may undermine the civic virtues underlying democracy.132 If noncitizens are
able to obtain the benefits of citizenship without the obligations, they may
develop an “entitlement mentality” and erode “the democratic spirit of their
communities.”133 Finally, citizenship provides a bond in “polyglot societ[ies]
like [the United States].”134 In a society without racial, ethnic, or religious
commonalities, citizenship serves as a basis for commonality.135 Absent
citizenship, it may be difficult for individuals to transcend their differences.
My approach to allocating the right to remain takes into account the factors
that Professor Schuck has identified as making citizenship valuable. The right
to remain would not be granted to every noncitizen present in the United
States. Rather it would be available to noncitizens who have the required
connections, commitment, and obligations to the United States. It is these
factors—connection, commitment, and obligation—that ensure cultural
assimilation and adherence to civic virtues. Concerns about government
accountability can be addressed by extending the right to vote to the
noncitizens I have identified. At various points in U.S. history, noncitizens
have been able to vote.136 This right can be extended to individuals based on
their connections, commitment, and obligations to the United States rather than
their legal status. Finally, I have less confidence in the ability of citizenship
status to create bonds of commonality in the United States. Throughout history,
women and various racial and ethnic groups have struggled to have their
citizenship status acknowledged and valued by mainstream American society,
and that struggle continues today.137 Stories about presumed foreignness from
second- and third-generation Mexican and Latin American immigrants suggest
that additional work is needed before citizenship status operates as a bond of
commonality in the United States.138 Consequently, I do not see lower

132

Id. at 172 (“[Democracy] is also a normative order, an ethos that legitimizes certain process values and
nourishes particular ways of thinking about the means and ends of politics.”).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.; see also JACOBSON, supra note 17, at 40 (discussing similar concerns in Germany and France).
136 Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114, 114 (1931) (discussing
history of noncitizen voting in the United States); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Noncitizen Voting and the
Extraconstitutional Construction of the Polity, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 30 (2010) (same); Sarah Song, Democracy
and Noncitizen Voting Rights, 13 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 607, 608 (2009) (same).
137 See, e.g., MIA TUAN, FOREVER FOREIGNERS OR HONORARY WHITES? THE ASIAN ETHNIC EXPERIENCE
TODAY (1998); see also RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN
AMERICANS 379–405 (updated and rev. ed. 1998) (discussing the internment of Japanese Americans).
138 See TOMÁS R. JIMÉNEZ, REPLENISHED ETHNICITY: MEXICAN AMERICANS, IMMIGRATION, AND
IDENTITY 140–41 (2010); ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT
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naturalization rates as a significant threat to developing common bonds in the
United States. By focusing on noncitizens with significant connections,
commitment, and obligations to the United States, my approach to protecting
an individual’s right to remain bolsters the essence and substance of citizenship
rather than devalues it. My approach seeks to identify the reasons why
citizenship is valuable and measure those factors, rather than relying on
citizenship status as an effective proxy for those factors.
The connections that LPRs develop during their residence in the United
States provide a basis for being recognized as a member of a polity. Legal
membership is thought to be the “juridical expression” of social
membership.139 As Professor Peter Spiro has noted, the goal of citizenship law
is to “map[] the boundaries of community” by tracking “the social facts of
community membership.”140 Yet, the social fact of such membership is not
always legally recognized. The social facts of an individual, like Gerardo’s
life, suggest membership, and he should have a robust right to remain in the
United States.
III. PROPORTIONALITY
The right to remain is a tool for protecting an individual’s liberty interest in
remaining in the United States. The connections an individual has with the
polity, rather than citizenship status, are an important factor in determining
whether deportation is disproportionate. Since the introduction of post-entryconduct deportation grounds in the United States, the proportionality principle
has guided congressional decision making.
This Part demonstrates that concerns about proportionality were expressed
through debates about the seriousness of deportable crimes and the impact
deportation would have. There was disagreement about how to define crimes
serious enough to warrant deportation, whether foreign-born residents should
have to naturalize to escape deportation, if naturalization was not required how
long should one have to reside in the United States before deportation was no
longer appropriate, and what role family hardship should play in the analysis.
Within these debates there was remarkable agreement that deportation based
on post-entry conduct needed to be proportionate. While there was no love lost
255–58 (3d ed. 2006); ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, LEGACIES: THE STORY OF THE IMMIGRANT
SECOND GENERATION (2001).
139 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).
140 SPIRO, supra note 16, at 5.
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for noncitizens committing serious crimes in the United States, there was
consensus that some noncitizens are significantly connected to the United
States such that deporting them could be excessive and unjust.141
A. The Proportionality Principle
Proportionality is a foundational principle in numerous areas of law.142 This
principle dictates that punitive measures should be proportionate to the
wrongdoing. Punitive measures, whether criminal or civil, can restrict an
individual’s fundamental rights.143 The proportionality principle provides a
basis for balancing the government’s interest in punishment and an
individual’s fundamental rights.144 The Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of proportionality in the criminal and civil contexts.145 In the
criminal context, this is expressed through the idea “that punishment for [a]
crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”146 The Eighth
Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishment,147 and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines seek to provide punishments that are proportionate to
the seriousness of the criminal offense and the harm to the victim and
community.148 In the civil context, the Supreme Court has concluded that
disproportionate punitive damages awards can violate the Constitution’s
protection of substantive due process.149 In each of these contexts, the
proportionality principle “provides a basis for ensuring that the appropriate
balance is struck between restraining fundamental liberty interests and

141 See infra Part V.B for a discussion of how to balance noncitizens’ connections and the seriousness of
their criminal activity.
142 Stumpf, supra note 11, at 1687–89 (discussing proportionality in criminal law, contracts, and torts).
143 In the criminal context, an individual’s physical liberty could be at stake. In the civil context, the
Supreme Court has held that excessively large punitive damage awards can violate a substantive due process
right to reasonable punitive damages. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–62 (1993) (plurality opinion); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1991).
144 Eric Engle, The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview, DARTMOUTH L.J.,
Winter 2012, at 1.
145 See Banks, supra note 11, at 1662–71.
146 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
147 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
148 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (noting that grossly disproportionate criminal
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, introductory
cmt. (2008).
149 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93, 103 (1997) (noting that the “Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses already protect individuals
from sanctions which are downright irrational); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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punishment.”150 In 1917, Congress sought to achieve the right balance between
protecting noncitizens’ liberty interest in remaining in the United States and
protecting public safety.151 The seriousness of the crime and what impacts
deportation would have on the deportee, his family, his local community, and
the country shaped whether deportation was considered a proportionate
response to criminal activity.152
B. Defining Serious Crime
The 1917 Immigration Act marked a significant turning point in the use of
deportation in the United States.153 With this legislation deportation was used
to regulate the post-entry conduct of foreign-born residents.154 Foreign-born
residents who failed to naturalize were now deportable if they were found to be
anarchists within five years of admission; prostitutes; convicted of importing
noncitizens for the purpose of prostitution or other immoral purposes;
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and sentenced to one year or
more imprisonment within five years of admission; or convicted of more than
one crime involving moral turpitude with sentences of one year or more.155
Creating these deportable offenses was not easy for Congress, and it took

150

Banks, supra note 11, at 1655.
See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 133–34.
152 Id.
153 Between 1888 and 1917, Congress slowly expanded the Executive Branch’s authority to deport
foreign-born residents. See id. at 91–136. This expansion reflected new strategies for border control. The 1888
immigration legislation provided for the deportation of foreign-born residents who violated the contract labor
laws within one year of entry. Id. at 112. Entering the United States in violation of law became a deportable
offense in 1891. Id. at 115. One year later a revision of the Chinese Exclusion Act authorized the deportation
of Chinese laborers present in the United States without the government-issued certificate indicating their
presence in the United States before the enactment of the first Chinese Exclusion Act. Id. at 116. Beginning in
1907 any noncitizen woman or girl who was working as a prostitute within three years of her admission was
deportable. Id. at 125. This provision and the other expansions of the deportation authority bolstered the power
of the government to remove foreign-born residents who should not have been admitted in the first place. See
KANSTROOM, supra note 36.
154 In 1907, immigration law provided for the deportation of any noncitizen woman or girl found to be a
prostitute within three years of her admission. Id. at 125. Daniel Kanstroom has noted that while this looks like
post-entry conduct-based deportation it is not. This law “actually related to the long-standing attempt to
prevent the entry of prostitutes into the United States.” Id. The three-year limit made this deportation ground
difficult to utilize because immigration officers found it rather difficult to accurately determine a noncitizen’s
entry date. Women could avoid deportation by claiming admission more than three years prior. Id. at 125–26.
In 1910, the three-year limit was eliminated to address this problem. Id. at 126. Technically the 1907 and 1910
immigration laws provided for deportation for post-entry conduct, but the target was removing prostitutes who
should not have been admitted in the first place. Id. at 125. The 1917 Immigration Act was the first
comprehensive scheme for deporting noncitizens solely based on their behavior while in the United States.
155 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889.
151
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almost eight years.156 In the early part of the twentieth century it was not
uncommon to view deportation based on post-entry criminal conduct as
punishment.157 Accordingly, some members of Congress wanted to ensure that
any such deportation was proportionate.158

156

See infra notes 160–68 and accompanying text.
At various points during the debates and hearings, this sentiment was expressed. For example,
Representative Driscoll stated that “it is a punishment to deport a man.” 42 CONG. REC. 2752 (1908).
Representative Mann noted that he did not think Congress “ought to . . . permit [a noncitizen] to be taken away
as an additional penalty for a crime he may have committed.” Id. at 2754. He also questioned whether
additional penalties, such as deportation for post-entry conduct, should be considered before previous
immigration legislation had been fully implemented. Id. (remarking “Why, now, should we be endeavoring to
add more penalties before the law we have recently enacted has well gone into effect?”). The idea that postentry crime-based deportation is punishment was also acknowledged in discussions about deterrence.
Representative Burnett stated:
157

[O]ne of the worst punishments that could be inflicted on people of some countries—for instance,
of Russia—would be that of being sent back to his country, and the very threat hung over the
man of that kind of deportation would be as powerful a stimulus to good citizenship and
obedience to the law as anything else.
1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 44. Aaron Levy of the National Liberal Immigration League made a similar
comment stating that “in principle there ought [not] to be any objection to holding over the man who desires to
become a citizen of this country some threat of punishment in case he does not demean himself properly.” Id.
Those who supported deportation based on post-entry criminal convictions argued that deporting a
foreign-born resident with a criminal conviction was not punishment; rather, it was the removal of an
“undesirable citizen.” 53 CONG. REC. 5168, 5170 (1916). This perspective is based on the idea that admission
to and residence within the United States is a privilege granted to certain foreign-born residents. Once a
noncitizen demonstrates that they are not deserving of the privilege, removing them from the United States is
not punishment, it is merely rescinding a privilege offered. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 61-404, at 1 (1910); 42
CONG. REC. 2752, 2753 (1908). This reasoning mirrors arguments made by the Supreme Court in Fong Yue
Ting v. United States. 149 U.S. 698, 709, 730 (1893).
158 Additionally, there was a concern that such deportation grounds would violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution. For those who saw deportation based on post-entry criminal convictions as
punishment, the Ex Post Facto Clause posed a significant problem. Due to the retroactive nature of the
proposals, noncitizens would have been deportable based on criminal convictions obtained before the
enactment of the new immigration law. These noncitizens would be subject to an additional punishment that
did not exist at the time they were convicted. Representative Sabath stated:
I am quite satisfied that this bill, besides being essentially cruel in its effects, is also
clearly unconstitutional. It conflicts with section 9 of Article I of the Constitution, which
provides that “no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.” The bill provides that
“any alien who is now under sentence because of conviction of a felony shall at the expiration of
his sentence be taken into custody and returned to the country whence he came.” Bishop, in his
work on Criminal Law, says: An ex post facto law may, with reasonable precision, be defined to
be one making punishable what was innocent when done, or subjecting the doer to a heavier
penalty or burden than was then provided.
42 CONG. REC. 2755 (1908). He reiterated these ideas two years later, this time joined by Representatives
Küstermann and O’Connell. Again, they were concerned for the following reason:
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Between 1908 and 1916, debates ensued about which crimes were serious
enough to warrant deportation. During each series of debates, members of
Congress disagreed about what terminology accurately described serious
crimes. In 1908 the concern was about the term felony, in 1910 it was about
imprisonment for at least one year, and by 1916 it was about crimes involving
moral turpitude.159 Each of these phrases was considered to encompass minor
crimes for which deportation was a drastic consequence. Use of the term felony
caused problems because “[i]n some of our States the stealing of a lamb, a
chicken, a chunk of coal, a loaf of bread, or anything, no matter how
insignificant, the selling of liquor, playing cards, or wagering on a horse race
are made felonies.”160 Determining seriousness based on the length of sentence
raised similar concerns about uniformity. In 1910:
[i]n some States violation of laws concerning the liquor traffic is
punished more severely than in others; in some States, it is said, the
breaking open of a poultry crate with intent to steal poultry therefrom
(however small the value of the latter may be) is punishable severely
as a felony; in a number of States various acts have been declared

[The post-entry crime-based deportation ground] prejudices and affects the offender because of
his past misdeeds for which he is already serving his sentence. This proviso in said bill is clearly
retroactive. The cardinal rule of law applicable in this instance is that laws must be prospective.
Besides, where an offender is now under sentence, this act would, if passed during the period of
his confinement in a jail, enhance his punishment, one legally pronounced by the court at the
time of sentence. And of such additional punishment the offender has had absolutely no
knowledge.
H.R. REP. NO. 61-404, pt. 2, at 1.
The Supreme Court did not explicitly answer this question until 1954. That year the Court held that the
Ex Post Facto Clause had no application to deportation. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). Previous
cases like Fong Yue Ting had held that deportation was not punishment and other constitutional provisions
dealing with criminal law were inapplicable. 149 U.S. at 709, 730. Yet when Fong Yue Ting was decided in
1893, deportation was not used to regulate noncitizens’ post-entry conduct, rather it was used as a form of
extended border control. See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 122, 124. Due to the significant consequences of
deportation, the Supreme Court has recently softened its categorization of deportation. In Padilla v. Kentucky,
the Court held that failure to advise a noncitizen about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea in a
criminal case could violate the noncitizen’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 130 S.
Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens frequently referred to deportation based on an
aggravated felony conviction as a penalty. Id. at 1480–81, 1486. This may signal a new understanding of
deportation as punishment when based on post-entry criminal convictions.
159 See infra notes 160–61, 162–68.
160 42 CONG. REC. 2754 (1908) (statement of Rep. Adolph Sabath). He also noted that the relationship
between felonies and misdemeanors was being reduced because “at the present time nearly every offense
punishable with imprisonment in the State prison or penitentiary is a felony. In nearly all the States
imprisonment in the penitentiary has been made the penalty for almost all misdemeanors, thereby transforming
them into felonies.” Id.
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unlawful, while such acts in other States are either not punishable at
161
all or are punishable by fine or imprisonment for one year or less.

Use of the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” raised the same problems
as the term felony. Representative Sabath of Illinois explained:
[A] crime involving moral turpitude has not been defined. No one can
really say what is meant by saying a crime involving moral turpitude.
Under some circumstances, larceny is considered a crime involving
moral turpitude—that is, stealing. We have laws in some States under
which picking out a chunk of coal on a railroad track is considered
larceny or stealing. In some States it is considered a felony. Some
States hold that every felony is a crime involving moral turpitude. In
some places the stealing of a watermelon or a chicken is larceny. In
some States the amount is not stated. Of course, if the larceny is of an
article, or a thing which is less than $20 in value, it is a misdemeanor
162
in some States, but in other States there is no distinction.

Other members of Congress, like Representative Bennet, felt that the
phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” conveyed the desired degree of
seriousness.163 He was supported by individuals such as Arthur Woods, the
police commissioner of New York City.164 Commissioner Woods testified
before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization and explained
that the Secretary of Labor would determine what constituted a crime
involving moral turpitude and that it was “not a question of watermelons,
chickens, or coal.”165 Crime-based deportation was justified as necessary to
protect public safety and develop the desired citizenry.166 Commissioner
Woods was only interested in serious crime, not “petty crimes—political
crimes or misdemeanors.”167 He was focused on the noncitizen “who knocks
down people in the street, who murders or who attempts to murder people, who
burglarizes our houses with blackjack and revolver, who attacks our women in
the city.”168

161 H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, pt. 2, at 1 (1910). The report’s authors were concerned that the proposal was
“too drastic, too sweeping in its effects, and . . . will be found promotive of severe hardships, which in many
cases amount to cruelty and inhumanity.” Id.
162 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 8.
163 53 CONG. REC. 5168 (1916).
164 Id.
165 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 8.
166 Id. at 14.
167 Id. at 3. He later reiterated his position stating, “I would not say if he has committed some offense, but
I say if he has committed a serious crime, a crime involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 8.
168 Id. at 14.
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Commissioner Woods’s sentiments were shared within Congress and a
consensus was reached that crimes involving moral turpitude with
imprisonment for at least one year were serious enough to warrant
deportation.169 Consensus on this point was reached only after Congress agreed
to authorize criminal trial judges to prevent deportation when it would be
disproportionate by issuing a judicial recommendation against deportation
(JRAD).170 Congress broadly defined the class of deportable noncitizens, but in
light of continuing concerns about the range of crimes constituting crimes
involving moral turpitude Congress provided for individualized proportionality
decisions by criminal trial judges.171 JRADs provided a procedural mechanism
whereby the impact of deportation could be taken into account.172
Congress’s conclusion about what crimes would be the basis for
deportation was shaped by the idea that deportation was a serious consequence,
perhaps even punitive.173 In light of the impact that deportation would have,
members of Congress were only willing to make serious crimes the basis for
deportation.
C. Impact of Deportation
Deporting noncitizens can have positive and negative effects on United
States interests. Those that supported crime-based deportation highlighted the
positive effects—removing undesirable individuals and protecting law-abiding
residents.174 Those with concerns about the new deportation grounds worried
about family hardship.175 Congress presumed that within five years of residing
in the United States, immigrants would get married, have children, and deepen
169

See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 134. Another limitation placed on deportations based on crimes
involving moral turpitude (CIMT) was a five-year statute of limitations. Only within the first five years of
admission was a noncitizen deportable based on a CIMT conviction. This limitation was based on the sense
that noncitizens became sufficiently connected, and thus members of the national community, in five years.
171 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90. See supra Part II for further discussion
about access to discretionary relief from deportation.
172 See 1916 Hearings, supra note 73, at 13–14.
173 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
174 See 1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 44. Some saw deportation based on post-entry criminal conduct
as an effective deterrent. See id. Aaron Levy, of the National Liberal Immigration League, had no “objection to
holding over the man who desires to become a citizen of this country some threat of punishment in case he
does not demean himself properly.” Id. He did, however, recognize that individual cases may involve hardship
that the law should address, but he did not think that it was wrong to hold “some threat over the head of the
man who wants to become part of us.” Id.
175 See, e.g., NGAI, supra note 116, at 57 (“Critics argued that deportation was unjust in cases where it
separated families or exacted other hardships that were out of proportion to the offense committed.”).
170
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their connections to and within the United States.176 The idea that the spouse
and children could be United States citizens only increased the importance of
those connections.177 What would become of the wives and children if the
husband or father were deported?178 Concerns about family hardship focused
on two issues: financial hardship and family separation.
Financial hardship was a congressional concern because of the broader
societal impact it could have. There was a presumption that the deported
noncitizen would be a man and the impacted family members would be his
wife and children.179 There were real concerns that the wife and children would
become financially destitute and possibly wards of the state. Representative
Sabath initially raised this concern in 1908 asking:
What is to become of [the wife and children]? Friendless, the wife
and children of a felon—a felon by the force of our unfair and
unequal law, shunned by neighbors, unable to obtain work wherewith
to earn a living, destitution staring them in the face. Who will provide
for them? Who will so shape their affairs for them that the children
may have the advantage of an education and grow up to become good
180
citizens?

Representative Sulzer of New York expressed a similar concern that year,
asking “what is to become of his children and what is to become of his wife?
Where do they go, and what is to become of them?”181 When the issue was
discussed during the hearings before the House Immigration and Naturalization
Committee in 1912, Aaron W. Levy, representing the National Liberal
Immigration League, raised a similar concern.182 He thought that deportation
based on post-entry criminal activity would create “a situation where we would
have doubtless a husband deported under the terms of this provision, and a
176 1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 44 (statement of Rep. Caleb Powers of Kentucky) (noting that after
five years of residence an immigrant had “established a home, and all that”).
177 See 42 CONG. REC. 2753 (1908).
178 See infra text accompanying notes 180–84.
179 See 53 CONG. REC. 5169 (1916); 42 CONG. REC. 2753 (1908). While there were significant concerns
about prostitution within the immigrant population, there was little to no discussion of immigrant women
having spouses or children who would be negatively impacted by deportation. See 53 CONG. REC. 5169
(1916); 42 CONG. REC. 2753 (1908). A notable exception was a statement from Representatives Goldfogle,
Sabath, Küstermann, and O’Connell in a minority report in 1910. H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, pt. 2, at 2 (1910).
They were concerned that “[i]f the convicted person was a woman having a family, though she had prior to the
commission of her offense lived uprightly, she would have to be deported and separated from her children,
probably forever.” Id.
180 42 CONG. REC. 2755 (1908).
181 Id. at 2753.
182 See 1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 36.
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wife and children remaining charges upon the public for their support.”183
Representative Sabath reiterated his concern in 1916 stating:
We may very likely have cases where a man has married within five
years after his arrival in this country. He may have married an
American woman and may have children. What will become of his
wife and his children if he is deported? The danger is not so great if
184
we change the limit to three years.

The actual separation of families was also seen as a family hardship
impacting United States interests. Representatives Goldfogle, Sabath,
Küstermann, and O’Connell recognized that deportation could lead to
permanent family separation.185 They were concerned that this separation
would cause a hardship on the wife left behind.186 Their report stated:
If [the deported individual] were married, then whether his wife was
an American citizen or his children were born here would be
immaterial matters, for the deportation would follow just the same.
Be the wife ever so pure and her children ever so helpless, still in
some States she could not obtain a divorce and would be compelled
to remain in a state of permanent separation from her exiled
187
husband.

Other members of Congress even thought that such separation could constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.188
Congress recognized that deporting noncitizens would have an impact on
families. Deportation could cause financial hardships and family separation,
which were seen as undesirable and potentially disproportionate outcomes. To
limit the occurrence of such outcomes, Congress provided for individualized
review of deportation decisions.
183

Id. at 41–42.
53 CONG. REC. 5169 (1916).
185 H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, pt. 2, at 2 (1910) (“The deportation would in most cases work a complete
separation of the alien from his wife and children.”).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 42 CONG. REC. 2755 (1908). While discussing his constitutional concerns, Representative Sabath
noted:
184

Surely the deportation and separation forever from those nearest and dearest to him of a person
for any minor offense which we constitute or call a felony is so cruel and unusual a punishment
as to come clearly within the purview of [the Eighth Amendment] of the Federal Constitution.
Id. He repeated this concern in 1912, asking, “Would not this be a discrimination? Would this not be an
unusual punishment, to separate a husband from wife and child?” 1912 Hearings, supra note 102, at 42.
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D. Protecting Proportionality
Congress utilized two types of discretionary relief to limit disproportionate
outcomes in crime-based deportation cases. Criminal trial judges granted one
type of relief and immigration judges granted a second type of relief.
Criminal trial judges issued judicial recommendations against deportation
(JRADs). Members of Congress such as Representatives Goldfogle, Sabath,
Küstermann, and O’Connell saw JRADs as a critical feature of any post-entry
crime-based deportation regime.189 At first they wanted trial judges to
affirmatively recommend deportation to the Secretary of Labor.190 They
believed that the trial judge was “best able to tell whether the offense is of a
character so grave, aggravated, and serious as will warrant deportation.”191
They had faith in the judiciary to determine when deportation would be
disproportionate.192 They believed that trial judges were sufficiently publicly
oriented to recommend deportation when it was necessary to protect public
safety.193 By 1916 the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee
agreed to allow trial judges to issue recommendations against deportation to
the Secretary of Labor.194
189

H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, pt. 2, at 2.
Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. (“The judiciary may be trusted to determine by way of recommendation to our Government
whether such convicted person should be deported.”).
193 Id. They wrote:
190

We believe no federal, state, or territorial judge would hesitate for a moment, if he found that the
welfare or safety of the State actually required it, to recommend deportation of criminals. The
judiciary may well be invested with the province of making such recommendation, for no judge
with due regard to the sentiment of the community in which he serves would withhold it in any
proper case.
Id.
194 53 CONG. REC. 5165 (1916). In 1916 the major debate about JRADs concerned when judges should be
allowed to issue them. See id. at 5169–71. The committee language required the recommendation to be made
at the time of judgment or sentencing. Id. at 5169. Representative Sabath wanted judges to have additional
time to ensure that the recommendation got made and that judges had time to become knowledgeable about all
of the relevant facts. Id. He explained:

I am trying to give the court jurisdiction so that it can, at any time after imposing judgment, make
a recommendation that the alien be not deported. I believe this is a fair amendment. Frequently
during the trial of a case the judge may omit or forget to make a recommendation, and thereby
the alien may be deprived of the provisions of this act and of the benefits which we are trying to
give him.
Id. He was also concerned about the information available to courts at the time of judgment and sentencing
because “frequently, after the conviction, conditions arise that may lead a judge to make recommendations that
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Judicial recommendations against deportation remained a part of U.S.
immigration law until 1990, yet they did not have the mitigating effect
envisioned by Representative Sabath.195 The potential power of JRADs was
never realized because judicial authority to issue a JRAD was not widely
known and was therefore rarely used.196 Professors Taylor and Wright have
reported that in most jurisdictions JRADs were “‘virtually unheard of.’”197
While criminal trial judges did not play a significant role in ensuring that
deportations were proportional, immigration judges exercised their power to
provide discretionary relief from deportation.

the man should not be deported, whereas if he made the recommendation at the same time he might, in view of
the conditions that existed then, recommend immediate deportation.” Id. at 5170. His proposal to allow judges
to make a JRAD any time after sentencing was rejected, as was a proposal by Representative Siegel of New
York giving judges thirty days after judgment or sentencing. Id. at 5171–72. Later that day, however, the
House agreed that a judge or a court would have thirty days after judgment or sentencing to make a JRAD. Id.
at 5174. When Representative Powers offered his amendment to give judges thirty days to issue a JRAD, he
explained:
I believe that things might arise within 30 days after the sentence has been passed that would
completely change the mind of the court and make him aware within that time that he ought to
make his recommendation when he would not know it immediately after passing sentence. The
State, under my amendment, is to have due notice of the proposed action of the judge or court.
Id. This time there was no discussion of the amendment and it became part of the 1917 Immigration Act. See
id. The debates over Representatives Sabath’s and Siegel’s proposed amendments focused on whether courts
or judges would have the authority to issue a JRAD after sentencing was complete. See id. at 5171–74. There
was little debate as to whether judges ought to make such recommendations. See id. at 5164, 5169–72. Even in
1910 the Acting Secretary of Labor and Commerce did not object to this proposal. H.R. REP. NO. 61-496, at 3
(1910). He thought that either trial courts or the Secretary of Labor and Commerce should “decide in all cases
whether the alien convicted shall be deported.” Id. He did, however, object to both institutions having this
authority, stating that the “responsibility should be on either the court or the Secretary.” Id.
195 See Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1131, 1148–52 (2002). JRADs were eliminated in a crime control bill that became part of the Immigration
Act of 1990. Id. at 1150–51. The legislative history is remarkably silent as to why JRADs were eliminated. See
id. at 1151. JRAD proponents lobbied Congress, but “the issue was never addressed in congressional debates.”
Id. The elimination of JRADs came along with “the waves of increasingly harsh congressional measures
intended to crack down on noncitizen criminal offenders.” Id.
196 Id. at 1148–49. Furthermore the high rates of plea bargains meant that sentencing judges did not have
JRAD determinations in the record. Id. at 1148.
Interestingly Immigration and Naturalization Services did not keep statistics on JRAD grants or
denials. Id. at 1148. The INS did estimate however that it received 3,000 responses for JRADs in the 1990s. Id.
at 1148 n.63.
197 Id. at 1148 (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Guzman, 744 F. Supp. 997, 997 (E.D. Wash. 1990)).
Ironically in 1994 Congress provided for judicial deportation. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 125 (1996).
Despite congressional conclusions in 1990 that criminal trial judges should not issue JRADs because
immigration law is so complicated, in 1994 Congress concluded that these judges should be able to deport
noncitizens. Id. The desire to accelerate the removal of noncitizens with criminal convictions appears to have
overridden earlier congressional concerns that criminal trial judges may not get the immigration law correct.
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The 1952 INA provided two ways in which immigration judges could
provide relief from deportation in cases where deportation would be
disproportionate—Section 212(c) relief and suspension of deportation. Section
212(c) relief was available to LPRs who had resided in the United States for at
least seven consecutive years.198 Suspension of deportation was available to
any noncitizen who had been continuously present in the United States for
seven years, had good moral character, and whose deportation would cause
extreme hardship to the noncitizen or his or her citizen or LPR spouse, parent,
or child.199 To make these determinations, immigration judges were directed to
“balance the adverse factors evidencing the alien’s undesirability as a
permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented in his
[or her] behalf to determine whether the granting of . . . relief appears in the
best interest of this country.”200
Immigration judges were trusted to balance the severity of the criminal act
and the connections to the United States to decide if deportation was

198 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187 (repealed 1996). Section
212(c) authorized the Attorney General to admit noncitizens, even if they were inadmissible under the statute,
if the individual was an LPR “who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of
deportation, and who [was] returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years.” Id. The
Attorney General’s discretion was limited to certain inadmissibility grounds. The INA did not authorize the
Attorney General to waive inadmissibility grounds that addressed national security. See id.
The language of the statute created a situation in which LPRs who left and were seeking admission
could have inadmissibility grounds waived, but LPRs who remained in the United States and became
deportable based on the same activity could not have their deportation waived. For example, if an individual
had committed a crime involving moral turpitude, Section 212(c) would allow the inadmissibility ground to be
waived, but not the deportation ground. The Second Circuit addressed this issue in Francis v. INS and held that
distinguishing between LPRs who have departed the United States and those who have not was “wholly
unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest.” 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976). As such, it failed the
rational basis test. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals followed the Francis rule in In re Silva. 16 I. & N.
Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976). Between 1976 and 1996, deportable LPRs could seek relief from deportation
pursuant to § 212(c).
199 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(c).
200 In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Marin, 16 I. &
N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (B.I.A. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally:

Favorable factors considered by immigration judges include[d] family ties to the United States,
length of residence in the United States, evidence of hardship to the individual deemed
deportable and his or her family in the case of deportation, employment history, property or
business ties to the United States, service in the U.S. Armed Forces, value and service to the
community, proof of genuine rehabilitation from criminal behavior, and other evidence of good
character. Adverse factors considered by immigration judges include[d] the nature and
underlying circumstances of the exclusion or deportation ground at issue, additional significant
violations of U.S. immigration law, a criminal record, and other evidence of bad character.
Banks, supra note 58, at 509 (footnote omitted).
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warranted. Immigration judges served as gatekeepers ensuring that deportation
was a proportionate response to a specific noncitizen’s criminal activity.
The deportation regime introduced in the 1917 Immigration Act was based
on two ideas—the jus nexi principle and proportionality. Congress recognized
that noncitizens may be “ours” based on their connections to the United States
and that deportation could be a disproportionate response to criminal activity.
To address this concern, the crime-based deportation regime adopted that year
created statutes of limitation for deportable criminal offenses and provided for
individualized review. The normative principles identified in Parts II and III
provided the foundation for our first comprehensive crime-based deportation
regime.201 By 1996 it was difficult to see these principles at play in the crimebased deportation regime. Part IV offers an explanation of this trajectory and
contends that a return to these principles is necessary for a just deportation
regime.
IV. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MEMBERSHIP AND PROPORTIONALITY
The dominant congressional narrative about immigrants and crime in 1917
recognized that there was variation within the immigrant population. By 1996
there was little acknowledgement of such variation. During the late 1980s,
congressional discourse about immigrants and crime was dominated by
concerns about unauthorized migrants and the impact that the illicit drug trade
was having on American communities.202 The narrative focusing on
unauthorized migrants and illicit drugs had the most resonance within
Congress. Simultaneously the notion of serious crime was expanding. As
members of Congress began to see a wider range of criminal activity as
serious, it became easier to view deportation as a proportionate response. This
Part argues that the dominant narrative about immigrants and crime and a
broad conception of serious crime have led to a new understanding of
deportation as a proportionate response to criminal activity.

201

See supra Parts II, III.
See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo,
Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91
MINN. L. REV. 1369 (2007).
202
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A. The Immigrants at Issue
The congressional discourse surrounding the 1996 immigration reforms
focused on immigrants being violent criminals who entered the country
unlawfully. Members of Congress saw a causal relationship between the
increase in unauthorized migration and an increase in violent crimes.203 For
example, then-Congressman Schumer stated that “the repeated violence and
costly burden of criminal aliens is one of the most vexing problems of our
criminal justice system.”204 He then went on to note that many of these
criminals “entered the country illegally” and have “forfeited their right to
reside here.”205 The narrative focused on the unauthorized status of the
noncitizens engaged in criminal activity. A Senate report on immigrants and
crime stated that “[c]riminal aliens occupy the intersection of two areas of
great concern to the American people: crime and the control of our borders.”206
Representative Bilbray expressed concern about the high rate of recidivism
amongst unauthorized migrants in Los Angeles County.207
The legislative histories for the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 and IIRIRA are littered with references to “illegal aliens” and
“criminal aliens” as the most pressing immigration issues. The terms were
often conflated and it is not always clear whom the speaker considered a
“criminal alien.” At times the term was used to refer to all unauthorized
migrants who entered without inspection (EWIs), sometimes only to EWIs
who had been convicted of a criminal offense, and other times any noncitizen
who had been convicted of a criminal offense. The conflation of “illegal
aliens” and “criminal aliens” made it easier for members of Congress to
203

See infra text accompanying notes 213–23.
Criminal Aliens: Hearing on H.R. 723, H.R. 1067, H.R. 1279, H.R. 1459, H.R. 1496, H.R. 2041, H.R.
2438, H.R. 2730, H.R. 2993, H.R. 3302, H.R. 3320 (Title IV), H.R. 3860 (Titles II, V, VI), H.R. 3872, and H.
Con. Res. 47 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Law, Immigration, & Refugees of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 117 (1994) [hereinafter Criminal Aliens Hearing].
205 Id.
206 S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 1 (1995). The report also noted that “[c]riminal aliens are a growing threat to
the public safety and a growing drain on scarce criminal justice resources.” Id. at 6.
207 He noted:
204

In Los Angeles [C]ounty about 40% of illegal aliens are rearrested later for new criminal
offenses. This last statistic, I believe, is very important. It is important because if we take action
to deal with criminal aliens and do nothing about the ease of entering the United States illegally,
then criminal aliens that we deport will continue to re-enter the country and commit crimes. That
is why I believe that Congress must reform, not just one section of the law, but our nation’s laws
governing both legal and illegal immigration in their entirety.
Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 129.
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conclude that deportation was an appropriate and proportionate response to any
criminal activity.208 During the 1994 hearings on criminal aliens,
Representative Becerra asked for clarification as to “what we mean by a
criminal alien.”209 Information from the Department of Justice officials stated
that the statistics they had tracked citizenship status, but not immigration
status.210 The statistics could identify the number of noncitizen inmates, but not
the number of inmates who were unauthorized migrants.211 Witnesses
reporting on state prison statistics, however, did indicate the number of
unauthorized migrant inmates.212 So some witnesses were referring to
noncitizens with criminal records while others focused on unauthorized
migrants with criminal records. The variety of immigration statuses within the
“criminal alien” category was lost on many members of Congress. There was
very little recognition that the reforms adopted would impact long-term green
card holders just as much as they would impact unauthorized migrants. The
limited use of a more complex narrative about immigrants and crime by
members of Congress made it easier to conclude that deportation was a
proportionate and legitimate government response to a wide range of criminal
activities.
B. Defining Serious Crime
Congressional concerns about noncitizens and crime were not new in the
late 1980s. As noted in Part III, this concern led to the enactment of the first
comprehensive post-entry crime-based deportation regime in 1917.213 What
was different by the mid-twentieth century was the sense that crime by
immigrants was a pervasive and consistent threat to American communities.214
Then-Congressman Schumer remarked that the “Federal Government [was]

208

See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-48; 142 CONG. REC. 10,053–62 (1996).
Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 140.
210 Id. at 141, 186–87.
211 Id. at 140–41, 165–67, 186–87.
212 Id. at 130 (California); id. at 150 (New York, Florida).
213 Debates about which crimes were serious enough to warrant deportation did not end with the
enactment of the 1917 Immigration Act. Between 1917 and 1996, the criminal grounds for deportation based
on post-entry conduct expanded. See supra text accompanying notes 119–22.
214 Senator Roth reported to Congress that a subcommittee investigation found that “criminal aliens are a
serious and growing threat to our public safety.” 142 CONG. REC. 10,054 (1996) (referencing S. REP. NO. 10448 (1995)). Representative Hunter noted that there was “a massive drain on the Federal Treasury and a massive
loss in terms of property loss and human life loss and a misery index with respect to the damage that criminal
aliens inflict on this country and on our people.” Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 130.
209
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failing in its first duty . . . to protect citizens from violent crime.”215
Representative Lamar Smith made a similar statement one year later. He noted:
An increasing amount of crime is being committed by noncitizens:
both legal and illegal aliens. About 25 percent of all Federal prisoners
are foreign-born. An astounding 42 percent of all Federal prisoners in
my State of Texas are foreign-born. Recidivism rates for criminal
aliens are high—a recent GAO study revealed that 77 percent of
noncitizens convicted of felonies go on to be arrested at least one
216
more time.

To address this problem, members of Congress sought to make it easier and
faster to remove immigrants with criminal records. This was achieved by
expanding the aggravated felony definition and creating expedited removal
proceedings for aggravated felons.217 But the discourse surrounding the need
for this expansion was based on the threat that serious drug crimes posed.
Between 1986 and 1996, numerous hearings were held and debates took place
examining the issue of immigrants and crime.218 A significant portion of these
hearings and debates focused on unauthorized migrants’ involvement in
serious drug-related crimes. The need to create harsh consequences for these
215 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 117–18. During the 1994 House hearings on the subject of
noncitizens and crime, then-Congressman Schumer also stated:

If you look at it through the eyes of our constituents, here we have tens of thousands of violent
criminals, repeat offenders of the worst kind, many of them who entered the country illegally, all
of them have forfeited their right to reside here, and yet our system is paralyzed; it doesn’t
promptly deport these violent criminals.
Id. at 117.
216 141 CONG. REC. E330 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1995).
217 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Citizenship Paradox in a Transnational Age, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1111,
1123 (2008) (book review).
218 See, e.g., Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration &
Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1–3 (1995) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith, Chairman,
H. Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims) (supporting enlarging the scope and size of the INS); Criminal Aliens
Hearing, supra note 204; Criminal Aliens in the United States: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter Criminal Aliens in the
Unites States Hearing] (noting the costs involved in re-apprehending deported criminal aliens who reentered
the country); H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 47 (1996); S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 7–10; H.R. REP. NO. 104-22, at 1
(1995) (recommending passage of the Criminal Alien Deportation Improvements Act of 1995); H.R. REP. NO.
101-955 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (dealing with the Immigration Act of 1990); 142 CONG. REC. 26,634–35, 26,669
(1996) (concerning the cost of immigration and other bills in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act,
1997); id. at 10,045 (debating the Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1996); id. at 7548;
141 CONG. REC. 15,038 (1995); id. at 8436 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein on the Illegal Immigration
Control and Enforcement Act of 1995); 141 CONG. REC. E330 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Lamar Smith); 141 CONG. REC. 4396 (1995) (regarding House Bill 668, the Criminal Alien Deportation
Improvements Act of 1995).
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crimes did not justify similar consequences for crimes such as perjury or
receipt of stolen property. Several witnesses and members of Congress raised
this concern, but they were unsuccessful in persuading Congress. The desire to
get tough on serious drug-related crime set the tone for dealing with all
aggravated felonies.
The hearings and debates on immigrants and crime between 1986 and 1996
focused on two problems: the cost of crime committed by unauthorized
migrants and the threat unauthorized migrants’ drug crimes posed to American
communities.219 Both of these factors ultimately influenced which crimes
members of Congress concluded were serious enough to warrant deportation.
Members of Congress testified that states had to shoulder a drastic increase
in criminal justice costs because of the federal government’s failure to prevent
unauthorized migration. Unauthorized migrants were said to be responsible for
increases in crime rates, particularly drug crimes.220 The costs were staggering.
For example, Congress was informed that California expected to pay $375
million during the 1994–1995 fiscal year to incarcerate criminals who were
unauthorized migrants.221 The costs in New York and Florida were estimated
to be $63 million and $58.6 million, respectively.222 Overall, it was reported
that federal and state prisons combined spent $723 million annually on
unauthorized migrant prisoners.223
In addition to these costs, members of Congress were concerned about the
type of criminal activity engaged in by unauthorized migrants. During the 1994
hearings on “criminal aliens,” Congress was informed that there had been a
“rapid increase in drug related offenses for criminal aliens between 1987 and
1992” in San Diego County.224 Individuals testified that while drug-related
offenses were increasing throughout San Diego County, the increase within the
total population was “markedly slower.”225 The unauthorized migrant

219

Another area that received significant attention was immigration crimes.
See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 132 (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter).
221 Id. at 133 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Lehman). In today’s dollars, this would be over $500 million.
See Inflation Calculator, DAVEMANUEL.COM, http://www.davemanuel.com/inflation-calculator.php (last
visited June 18, 2013).
222 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 150 (statement of Rep. Gary A. Condit).
223 Id. at 128 (statement of Rep. James H. Bilbray).
224 Id. at 132 (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter).
225 Id.
220
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population was seen as directly responsible for the increase in drug-related
crimes.226 In 1990, Senator Graham noted:
Of the 2,400 criminal aliens the Florida statewide Prosecutor’s
Office could provide me information on, 657 were convicted on
cocaine trafficking—over 25 percent. This number indicates the
magnitude of the problem and the urgency of the need to provide
States with relief. It is the Federal Government’s responsibility to
protect our borders. If the Government fails to prevent dangerous
aliens from crossing our borders, it then becomes the responsibility of
the Federal Government to help the States cope with the crime and
the costs of prosecuting criminal aliens. Finally, the Federal
Government must make sure that dangerous aliens are not on the
streets, not allowed to commit new crimes, and not caught in a
227
lengthy deportation process.

This became a persistent theme by the mid-1990s. For example,
Representative Duncan Hunter testified that “[o]ver half of the felony crimes
committed by undocumented immigrants in San Diego during 1992 were drug
related, representing over 18% of the total felony drug offenses in the
county.”228 Broad terms like drug-related crimes, drug offenses, and drug
violations were used during the hearings, but it appears that the focus was on
drug trafficking.229 Kathleen Hawk, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
testified that 81% of the noncitizen criminals in federal prison for drug law
violations were serving sentences for drug trafficking.230 Another 18% were
serving sentences for drug importation.231 These figures mirrored general
trends in federal incarceration. In 1995, 60% of federal inmates were
incarcerated for drug offenses.232 Drug offenders accounted for over 80% of
the total growth in federal inmates between 1985 and 1995.233 By the mid-

226

The Border Patrol’s seizure of record numbers of narcotics was cited as a “prime indicator of the
increase in criminal alien behavior in California.” Id.; Criminal Aliens in the United States Hearing, supra note
218, at 1 (statement of Sen. Sam Nunn) (“Criminal aliens, for example, are widely seen as having been and
continuing to be a significant part of the Nation’s drug problem. Problems involving criminal aliens also came
to our attention in a vivid way in 1987 in the aftermath of the notorious Cuban Mariel boat lift.”).
227 136 CONG. REC. 36,456–57 (1990) (statement of Sen. Bob Graham).
228 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 132 (statement of Rep. Duncan Hunter).
229 See, e.g., id. at 115–16 (statement of Rep. Benjamin Gilman) (referring to “serious criminal activity,
such as drug trafficking”).
230 Id. at 167 (statement of Kathleen Hawk, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons).
231 Id.
232 CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 164619, PRISONERS IN 1996,
at 11 (1997).
233 Id.
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1990s, drug activity was an important factor in increased rates of
incarceration.234
The high drug-related incarceration numbers are not driven by noncitizens
because they have very low incarceration rates. In 1980, immigrants’
institutionalization rate was only 30% of the institutionalization rate for nativeborn individuals.235 By 1990, immigrants’ institutionalization rate increased to
almost 50% of the institutionalization rate for native-born individuals but
dropped in 2000 to 20%.236 These figures correspond with the evidence
available since the early 1900s and indicate that there is no connection between
increased immigration and increased crime rates. In 1910, the U.S.
Immigration Committee (popularly known as the Dillingham Commission)
concluded:
No satisfactory evidence has yet been produced to show that
immigration has resulted in an increase in crime disproportionate to
the increase in adult population. Such comparable statistics of crime
and population as it has been possible to obtain indicate that
immigrants are less prone to commit crime than are native
237
Americans.

In 1994, the United States Commission on Immigration Reform reached
similar conclusions.238 At the time that Congress was debating the 1996
immigration reforms, evidence demonstrated that increased immigration, even
unauthorized migration, was not causing or correlated with an increase in
crime in the United States.239 Evidence, however, did not carry the day. The
234 The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University has found that 80% of
federal inmates were incarcerated based on drug or alcohol laws; had regularly used an illegal drug; were
under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time they committed the crime; committed the offense to get
money for drugs; or have a history with alcohol abuse. NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT
COLUMBIA UNIV., BEHIND BARS: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2 (1998).
235 KRISTIN F. BUTCHER & ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, WHY ARE IMMIGRANTS’ INCARCERATION RATES SO
LOW? EVIDENCE ON SELECTIVE IMMIGRATION, DETERRENCE, AND DEPORTATION 10 (2005). The
institutionalization rate covers individuals in correctional facilities, mental hospitals, and other institutions.
Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Why Are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on
Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13229, 2007). Researchers have concluded that for men aged 18 to 40, institutionalization closely
approximates incarceration. Id. at 5–6.
236 BUTCHER & PIEHL, supra note 235, at 10.
237 U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, IMMIGRATION AND CRIME, S. DOC. NO. 61-750, at 1 (3d Sess. 1910).
238 U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY 4
(1994).
239 The trends from the 1980s and 1990s continued into the twenty-first century. Crime rates declined in
the 1990s and early 2000s despite historic highs in authorized and unauthorized migration. RUBÉN G.
RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY
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perception that serious crime is caused or aggravated by immigrants
persisted.240 Although there was significant evidence that noncitizens were
involved in serious crimes, which increased criminal justice costs for states,241
a holistic review of criminal justice costs and incarceration rates demonstrates
that noncitizens were responsible for a small portion of those increases.242
Testimony about noncitizens and drug trafficking supported the creation of
a deportation regime that provided for swifter and more certain deportation.243
Yet the reforms enacted for accelerated and certain deportation were not
limited to drug traffickers; they were applied to all aggravated felonies. As
discussed in Part I, when the term aggravated felony was first introduced, it
referred to specific serious crimes—murder, drug trafficking, and illicit
trafficking in firearms or destructive devices.244 Through the enactment of
several laws in the 1990s, the aggravated felony definition was expanded to
cover a much wider range of criminal activity.245 These laws expanded the
definition of an aggravated felony to include crimes such as perjury,
obstruction of justice, a crime of violence, theft (including receipt of stolen
property), and burglary.246
The expanded definition was justified as necessary to ensure that
immigrants who engaged in serious criminal activity would be deported and

AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 4
(2007). Between 1994 and 2006, the foreign-born population increased 71%, from 22 million to 38 million. M.
Kathleen Dingeman & Rubén G. Rumbaut, The Immigration–Crime Nexus and Post-Deportation Experiences:
En/Countering Stereotypes in Southern California and El Salvador, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 363, 373 (2010).
During approximately the same time period, there was a 34.2% decrease in the violent crime rate. RUMBAUT &
EWING, supra, at 4. Additionally, the homicide rate decreased 37.8%, the robbery rate dropped 40.8%, and the
assault rate fell 31.9%. Id.
240 RUMBAUT & EWING, supra note 239, at 14.
241 See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 111 (statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady).
242 See Butcher & Piehl, supra note 235, at 24 (noting that in 2000, the institutionalization rate of
immigrants was one-fifth that of native-born Americans).
243 See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 121 (statement of Rep. Charles E. Schumer).
244 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70 (current version
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
245 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div.
C, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -628 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43));
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277–
78 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–22 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43));
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)).
246 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
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unable to return to the United States.247 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) Deputy Commissioner, Chris Sale, testified that the expanded
definition proposed in 1994 included “sufficiently serious offenses” because
they corresponded to Class A to E felonies under federal law.248 Between 1994
and 1995, when this issue was discussed in Congress, members of Congress
also noted that the expanded definition captured “those egregious crimes of
violence that are often concomitant with drug-related crimes.”249
Despite this conception of seriousness, some executive officials and
members of the bar were concerned that the expanding deportation regime
would result in disproportionate responses to criminal activity. Executive
officials were particularly concerned about the aggravated felony definition’s
implications for compliance with the Refugee Convention. Members of the bar
raised broader concerns about proportionality. The Refugee Convention
247 See, e.g., Criminal Aliens in the United States Hearing, supra note 218, at 51 (statement of Doris M.
Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (remarking that the aggravated felony definition
“is helpful to us because it eliminates certain forms of relief that have been time consuming where effective
deportation has been concerned”); 142 CONG. REC. 26,635 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (noting that
the expanded aggravated felony definition will mean that “[m]ore criminal aliens will be deportable and fewer
will be eligible for waivers of deportation”); 141 CONG. REC. 8437 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (explaining that the expanded aggravated felony definition will “increase the number of criminals
who would qualify for deportation as having committed [an] aggravated felony”); id. at 4395 (statement of
Rep. Tillie Fowler) (expressing support for the Criminal Alien Deportation Improvements Act because it
makes “it easier to deport criminal aliens who have been convicted of a felony”).
Representative Hunter argued that expanding the definition would “help reduce the admittance of
recidivist aliens.” Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 132. By 1996, one of the immigration
consequences of being deported as an aggravated felon was being permanently barred from reentering the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). Representative Hunter used this argument to justify adding certain
crimes, including “burglary, child pornography, prostitution, perjury, espionage, alien smuggling, and tax
evasion” to the aggravated felony definition. Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 134.
248 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 194 (statement of Chris Sale, Deputy Comm’r,
Immigration and Naturalization Service). At that time, Class E felonies were subject to no more than three
years imprisonment and Class A felonies were subject to life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(5) (1994).
The same is true today. 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(5) (2012). The House Report on the Criminal Alien Deportation
Improvements Act of 1995 made a similar observation:

In adding crimes to the list, effort was made to ensure that the overall reach of the
definition would be consistent with the sentencing guidelines established by the United States
Sentencing Commission. With only certain limited exceptions, the Committee attempted to
ensure that all of the crimes defined as aggravated felonies carry a base offense level of at least
12. These minimums have been selected to ensure that only the most serious crimes, or the more
serious convictions of lesser crimes, render the alien deportable.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-22, at 7–8 (1995).
249 136 CONG. REC. 11,194 (1990). Representative Mazzoli noted that the aggravated felony definition
was expanded to include “other violent crimes” and “various other extremely serious crimes.” 140 CONG. REC.
29,219 (1994).
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prohibits signatories from expelling or returning a refugee to a country where
his “life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”250
One way the United States implements this treaty obligation is through
withholding of deportation.251 This treaty obligation does not extend to
individuals who have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime” and are
a danger to the United States.252 Therefore those with an aggravated felony
conviction cannot avoid deportation.253 Mary Ryan, Assistant Secretary for
Consular Affairs at the State Department, and INS Deputy Commissioner
Chris Sale expressed concern that the expanded definition of an aggravated
felony included crimes that were not “particularly serious.”254 Assistant
Secretary Ryan was concerned that the extension of the “definition of
aggravated felony to some property offenses that, while serious, may not
provide an adequate or appropriate basis for denial of withholding of
deportation to an alien who would face a real risk of persecution in the country
of return.”255 Deputy Commissioner Sale provided testimony that “[t]heft,
gambling, prostitution, perjury, and failure to appear in court” were “not the
type of ‘particularly serious crimes’ which would justify denying withholding
of deportation on account of persecution or threat of torture or death if the
250

United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. A refugee is defined as an individual who:
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id. at art. 1(A)(2). The 1967 Protocol removed the requirement that the events occurred before January 1,
1951. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
The United States became legally bound to the terms of the Protocol on November 1, 1968 and enacted
implementing legislation in 1980 through the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES,
STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL,
at 4 (2011).
251 Withholding of deportation is available if the Attorney General “decides that the [noncitizen’s] life or
freedom would be threatened . . . because of the [noncitizen’s] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
252 Refugee Convention, supra note 250, at art. 33(2); see also Refugee Protocol, supra note 250, at art.
1(1) (incorporating Refugee Convention, supra note 250, at art. 33(2)).
253 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
254 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 164, 194.
255 Id. at 164.
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person is returned to the home country.”256 Despite these repeated concerns by
executive officials, Congress enacted an expanded aggravated felony definition
that included the problematic crimes.257
In addition to these concerns, the American Bar Association (ABA) and the
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) informed Congress that
the expanded aggravated felony definition would lead to disproportionate
deportations.258 The AILA accepted that “those who commit serious criminal
offenses should be subject to serious consequences, up to and including
deportation in many cases.”259 Yet it and the ABA saw the new aggravated
felony definition as including “relatively minor crimes.”260 To illustrate this
point the ABA explained that “a person convicted of transporting a pig across
state lines, or stealing a postcard from a mail carrier, would be subject to
expedited procedures, barred from most forms of relief, including asylum and
perhaps 212(c), and ineligible for future immigration benefits.”261 AILA
concluded that the proposed expansion would be “absurd in its result.”262
The concerns of the ABA and executive officials are stronger today than
they were in the 1990s in light of the number of long-term residents deported
for minor criminal activity.263 Despite Congress’s desire to target unauthorized
migrants involved in violent drug-related crimes, the vast majority of those
deported under the 1996 reforms have been nonviolent offenders. Between
1997 and 2010, the United States government deported approximately 1.25
million immigrants due to criminal convictions.264 Only 24% of these
256

Id. at 194.
Congress addressed the Refugee Convention concern by only making noncitizens with an aggravated
felony conviction who have been sentenced to at least five years imprisonment ineligible for withholding from
deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
258 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 199.
259 Id. at 213.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 201.
262 Id. at 213.
263 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART (BY THE
NUMBERS): NON-CITIZENS DEPORTED MOSTLY FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENSES (2009) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, BY THE NUMBERS].
264 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS: 2010, at 4 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS]; OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 97
(2010) [hereinafter 2009 YEARBOOK]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009, at 4 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008, at 4 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS]; OFFICE
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2007,
257
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deportations have been due to violent crimes.265 The most frequent basis for
deportation was a nonviolent drug offense, which include crimes like
possession.266 Based on the way deportation figures are reported, it is difficult
to know how many noncitizens have been deported for drug trafficking.
Research by Human Rights Watch, however, provides some insight. A review
of deportation data from 1997 and 2007 suggests that deportations based on
drug trafficking account for at most 16.8% of deportations for which crime
data is available.267
Members of Congress rarely raised the concerns raised by the ABA as they
had in 1917.268 There was considerably less discussion on the record by
members of Congress challenging the expansion of the aggravated felony
at 4 (2008) [hereinafter 2007 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2006, at 4 (2008) [hereinafter 2006
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2005, at 5 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2004, at 6 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 150 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 YEARBOOK]; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 177 (2003) [hereinafter 2002
YEARBOOK]; INS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 236 (2003) [hereinafter 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]; INS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 235 (2002)
[hereinafter 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]; INS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 204 (2002) [hereinafter 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK];
INS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 203–04 (2000) [hereinafter 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]; INS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 167 (1999) [hereinafter 1997
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].
265 See supra note 264. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has provided similar statistics concluding that only
27.8% of crime-based deportations were based on violent crimes. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BY THE NUMBERS,
supra note 263, at 33. The statistics provided by HRW are based on data obtained through a Freedom of
Information Act request to the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 1. HRW received data on 897,099
deportations based on crime. Id. at 19. The data, however, is incomplete because for 395,272 cases, the data
did not include crime data, despite being characterized as a crime-based deportation. Id. at 28.
266 2010 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 264, at 4; 2009 YEARBOOK, supra note 264, at
97; 2009 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 264, at 4; 2008 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS, supra note 264, at 4; 2007 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 264, at 4; 2006
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 264, at 4; 2005 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS,
supra note 264, at 5; 2004 IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 264, at 6; 2003 YEARBOOK,
supra note 264, at 150; 2002 YEARBOOK, supra note 264, at 177; 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note
264, at 236; 2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 264, at 235; 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note
264, at 204; 1998 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 264, at 204; 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note
264, at 167; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 263, at 32, 56.
267 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 263, at 32.
268 See supra Part III.B (discussing the lengthy debate preceding enactment of the 1917 Immigration Act).
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definition. The late Professor Stuntz argued that rational legislators will
support legislation authorizing criminal punishment that is appropriate in a
small number of egregious cases, but excessive in most other cases.269 This
occurs because legislators risk getting blamed if a horrible case ends with
punishment the public thinks is lenient and the prosecutor explains that the
legislator did not provide the “tools necessary to do justice.”270 In agreeing to
the extreme punishment, Congress is trusting prosecutors and judges to
exercise their discretion to reach the appropriate result in each case. The
legislators are assuming that the extreme punishment will not be applied in
every case. Yet that is exactly what has happened in the immigration context.
Representative Lamar Smith articulated the dominant perspective about
immigrants and crime and their right to remain in the United States. He stated:
Americans should not have to tolerate the presence of those
who abuse both our immigration and criminal laws. Criminal aliens
should be on the fast track out of the country. This bill addresses the
concerns of the American people by giving the INS and prosecutors
271
tools they need to expedite the deportation of criminal aliens.

This perspective supported the expansion of the aggravated felony definition
and the conclusion that deportation for these crimes is appropriate and
proportionate. Members of Congress and others testifying before Congress
repeatedly justified the expansion of the aggravated felony definition based on
the idea that it targeted serious criminals.272 The reality has turned out to be
more complicated. The vast majority of those deported under the 1996 reforms
have been nonviolent offenders.273

269 William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2548, 2558 (2004).
270 Id. Members of Congress seem to have had similar concerns in the mid-1990s. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 12, at 31–32 (recounting statement of David A. Martin, former INS General Counsel, that
“even when [members of Congress] were presented with sympathetic facts, they just didn’t want to appear soft
on immigration”).
271 141 CONG. REC. E330 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lamar S. Smith); see also Criminal
Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 112 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) (“We on the task force believe that all
aliens who abuse the privilege of residing in this country by committing aggravated felonies should be
deported. No excuses, no delay.”); id. at 172 (statement of Rep. Anthony C. Beilenson) (“Bluntly put, an alien
who has been convicted of a criminal act in this country and has served his or her term in jail or prison should
not be allowed to remain here.”); S. REP. NO. 104-48, at 6 (1995) (“[T]here is just no place in America for
non-U.S. citizens who commit criminal acts here. America has enough criminals without importing more.”).
272 See supra text accompanying notes 247–49.
273 See supra text accompanying notes 264–67; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 42;
Hagan et al., supra note 12, at 1809.
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C. Impact of Deportation
The deportation of nearly 1.25 million noncitizens due to criminal activity
since 1996274 has occurred with little examination of the connections that these
noncitizens have to the United States. Most members of Congress did not see
the importance of distinguishing between connected and less connected
noncitizens. Failing to acknowledge such distinctions negatively impacts
American families.
1. Congressional Testimony
Distinguishing among noncitizens with criminal convictions was important
to some members of Congress, but they were unable to generate a robust
debate on this issue and persuade their colleagues. Representative Mazzoli,
Senator Kennedy, and others provided testimony to Congress that offered a
more complex narrative of immigrants and crime. This narrative included the
idea that some immigrants with criminal convictions are members of American
families and the American polity.275 Representative Mazzoli remarked:
[I]t is a very different ball game if these people are permanent
residents who may have lived in the San Fernando Valley for 15
years but decide one day to hold up a convenience store, and a person
who sneaked across the border a year ago or 5 months ago and
276
decided to stick up that same convenience store . . . .

Senator Kennedy noted that barring aggravated felons from discretionary relief
would deny relief to permanent residents for minor crimes.277 An individual
“could live here productively for 30 years and have an American citizen wife
and children. But for them, it is one strike and you are out.”278 As an example
he noted:
A long-time permanent resident could decide to go fishing. He hooks
and kills what he does not realize is a rare fish, which is a strict
liability felony with a mandatory minimum of 1 year. Even though he
is married to an American and has U.S.-citizen children, he is

274

See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 188.
276 Id. (statement of Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli, Chairman, Subcomm. on Int’l Law, Immigration, &
Refugees).
277 141 CONG. REC. 15,069 (1995) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy).
278 Id.
275
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convicted, serves his time, and is immediately deported with no
279
prospect for judicial review.

Senator Kennedy supported Section 212(c) relief because it allowed an
immigration judge to determine whether the immigrant’s “equities in the
United States—such as American citizen spouses or children or contributions
to [his or her] communit[y]”—outweighed the seriousness of his or her
criminal offense.280 This narrative of a connected member of the polity was
raised within the congressional debates, but it gained little traction.
A retired immigration judge, the American Bar Association, and the
American Immigration Lawyers Association all provided testimony to
Congress utilizing this more complex narrative. Arvid Boyes, a retired
immigration judge, recognized that immigrants with criminal convictions could
be long-term residents with significant ties to the United States.281 He thought:
[T]he best and the most sensible way of dealing with long term
resident aliens with ties to this Nation who have committed crimes is
to leave the resolution of their request for relief under section 212(c)
in the sound discretion of immigration judges. That is the state of the
law now, and I approve of it. To simply bar a long term resident alien
from even seeking section 212(c) relief by making him or her
statutorily ineligible (because he has been sentenced to a certain
number of years, as the new amendment proposes to do) is to
282
disregard numerous factors that rightly must be taken into account.

He believed that the relevant factors included “closeness of a family
relationship, the emotional need of the alien and his or her spouse to remain
together in the United States, the likelihood that deportation would cause the
destruction of a family, [and] the social, psychological and emotional effects
on young U.S. citizen children.”283 The American Bar Association similarly
recognized that immigrants with criminal convictions could be members of
American families.284 Finally, the AILA explained that immigrants’
connections to the United States could make deportation a disproportionate

279

Id.
Id.
281 Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 205.
282 Id. at 206 (statement of Arvid C. Boyes, U.S. Immigration J. (retired)).
283 Id. at 205–06 (statement of Arvid C. Boyes, U.S. Immigration J. (retired)).
284 See id. at 200 (statement of Robert D. Evans, American Bar Association) (“The resulting deportation
may separate U.S. citizen children from their parents or force innocent children to be uprooted to a distant
land.”).
280
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penalty.285 The AILA concluded that barring aggravated felons from
discretionary relief would “result in the deportation of many lawful permanent
residents whose crime is far outweighed by the contributions they make to
their U.S. families and communities.”286
Department of Justice officials also acknowledged this complex narrative.
David Martin, former general counsel to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, noted that Department of Justice officials were “keenly aware” that
those covered by criminal deportation grounds included “a vast spectrum of
human character and behavior. Some such criminals are truly dangerous, but a
large fraction of this class made single mistakes or had shown genuine
rehabilitation and remorse.”287 INS officials thought that “most such
deportable aliens should at least be eligible for consideration of release during
proceedings and for a discretionary waiver of deportation altogether.”288
The narrative offered by Representative Mazzoli, Senator Kennedy, and
other witnesses never took hold the way it did in the early 1900s. The
unauthorized violent criminal narrative prevailed despite the availability of
evidence to the contrary.289 The prevalence of this misconception is not
uncommon.290 Seventy-three percent of individuals surveyed in the National
Opinion Research Center’s 2000 General Social Survey thought that it was
very likely or somewhat likely that “‘more immigrants cause higher crime
rates.’”291 This dominant perception of immigrants and crime shaped
Congress’s conclusions about what constitutes a serious crime and whether
deportation would be a disproportionate penalty.
2. Social Science Research
Researchers have documented a variety of negative impacts that
deportation has on American families. Many families that experience

285

See id. at 214.
Id. (statement of Warren R. Leiden, Executive Director, and Jeanne A. Butterfield, Senior Policy
Analyst, American Immigration Lawyers Association).
287 David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning
of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 64.
288 Id.
289 See supra text accompanying notes 232–40.
290 See RUMBAUT & EWING, supra note 239, at 14 (noting the persistence of this misconception “among
policymakers, the media, and the general public”).
291 Id. at 3.
286
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deportation are mixed-status families.292 This means that the family may be a
combination of U.S citizens (by birth or naturalization), green card holders,
nonimmigrants, or unauthorized migrants.293 Often the children of deported
noncitizens are U.S. citizens.294 Between April 1997 and August 2007, 87,884
LPRs were deported for criminal convictions.295 On average these individuals
had lived in the United States for ten years.296 These LPRs were the parents of
approximately 103,000 children, and 86% of these children were United States
citizens.297 These families are experiencing educational, health, and financial
hardships that reverberate throughout society.298
A 2010 study by the Urban Institute examined the impact of deportation on
children.299 This report was based on a study of 190 children in eighty-five
families in six locations throughout the United States.300 The study
“examine[d] the consequences of parental arrest, detention, and
deportation.”301 The parents in this study “were arrested in work-site raids,
raids on their homes, or operations by local police officers.”302 This study
focused on parents who were unauthorized and therefore deportable.303 The
educational, health, and financial consequences for children of deportable
parents may differ from children whose parents are LPRs. It is possible that
LPR parents have more structural support in place so that when they are
deported the consequences differ. However, the consequences identified in this
study304 are similar to the consequences identified in studies on parental
incarceration.305 This suggests that the actual family separation leads to the
292 See Michael Fix & Wendy Zimmermann, All Under One Roof: Mixed-Status Families in an Era of
Reform, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 397, 400 (2001) (noting that “85 percent of immigrant families . . . are
mixed-status families”). The 1998 Current Population Survey indicated that 9% of U.S. families with children
were mixed-status families. Id. at 399. Eighty-five percent of immigrant families (families with at least one
noncitizen parent) at this time were mixed-status families. Id. at 400. This translates into 10% of children in
the United States living in mixed-status families. Id. at 400.
293 Id. at 397–98.
294 BAUM ET AL., supra note 12, at 4.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 12, at 27–53.
299 Id.
300 Id. at vii.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 27–53.
305 See BAUM ET AL., supra note 12, at 8 (“Available data on children whose parents are absent as a result
of incarceration suggest that these children may suffer a number of health problems.”).
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identified consequences. But at this point it is not possible to claim a causal
link. More data and research are needed to get a more accurate picture about
the consequences of deportation on children.
The Urban Institute study found that after the arrest of a deportable parent,
children missed school, struggled to maintain good grades, exhibited
behavioral and emotional problems in the classroom, and some considered
dropping out.306 And a variety of physical and mental health effects have been
documented in children whose parents have been arrested and deported.307
For example, over 40% of the children in the Urban Institute study
experienced behavioral changes within nine months.308 Children’s eating and
sleeping routines were disrupted and they began having difficulty controlling
their emotions.309 More than half of the children cried more frequently and
experienced more fear, and more than a third experienced more anxiety.310
Other reactions were to become “clingy, withdrawn, angry, or aggressive.”311
Families experiencing deportation face a loss of income, which impacts access
to housing and food.312 Families reported frequent moving, moving in with
relatives to lower housing costs, and losing homes because the cost became too
great.313 Another result of income loss is food hardship. The Urban Institute
found that 60% of the households in the study reported having difficulty
paying for food “sometimes” or “frequently.”314 As a result parents would cut
back on their food consumption to ensure that their children had enough to
eat.315 Over 20% of the parents reported that they experienced hunger.316
306 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 12, at 49–51; cf. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., URBAN INST., PAYING THE PRICE:
THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION RAIDS ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN 48–50 (2007) (noting that students missed
school, and that there were disruptions to academic performance and behavior).
307 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 12, at 41–48; see also CAPPS ET AL., supra note 306, at 50–54. Relatively
little research has been done in this area, but the work that has been done indicates that the effects of parental
deportation on children are similar to the effects of parental incarceration. See BAUM ET AL., supra note 12, at
8 (noting studies that found mental health impacts for children after a parent was deported). Research on
immigrant children in the United States who experienced parental separation because of immigration, divorce,
or death has found similar effects. Id. These children are more likely to exhibit signs of depression and feelings
of loss and sadness. Id.
308 BAUM ET AL., supra note 12, at 8.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 5.
313 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 12, at 30–31; see also CAPPS ET AL., supra note 306, at 46–47.
314 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 12, at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also CAPPS ET AL., supra
note 306, at 47–48.
315 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 12, at 31.
316 Id. at 32 tbl.3.3.
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Members of Congress failed to seriously evaluate these impacts of the 1996
reforms because the discourse focused on unauthorized migrants involved in
violent, drug-related crime.
D. New Conclusions
The dominant narrative of immigrants and crime led to the elimination of
Section 212(c) relief in 1996. Later that year the more complex narrative
offered by AILA and others began to have some impact. Congress enacted a
new form of discretionary relief to replace Section 212(c) relief: cancellation
of removal.317 Some form of discretionary relief was needed because the
existing crime-based deportation regime could be disproportionate. Senator
Hatch explained the amendment as necessary because “there was some
concern that there might be certain rare circumstances we had not
contemplated, when removal of a particular criminal alien might not be
appropriate.”318 An example of such a situation offered by Senator Hatch was
“an alien with one minor criminal conviction several decades ago, who has
clearly reformed and led an exemplary life and made great contributions to this
country.”319 He stated that in the “unusual cases involving exceptional
immigrants whose criminal records consist only of minor crimes committed
many years ago,” relief from deportation would be appropriate.320
While he did not use the language of proportionality, Senator Hatch’s
comments reflected the importance of proportionality in a crime-based
deportation regime. But the legal directives enacted in 1996 did very little to
effectuate his desired outcome and members of Congress have increasingly
questioned the proportionality of the regime enacted. In 1999, Representative
McCollum of Florida introduced the Fairness for Permanent Residents Act to
mitigate the harsh impact of the IIRIRA (the 1996 reforms).321 In introducing
the bill, he said:
Congress made several modifications to our country’s immigration
code that have had a harsh and unintended impact on many people
living in the United States. These individuals, permanent resident
aliens, have the legal right to reside in the country and apply for US
citizenship. They serve in the military, own businesses and made
317
318
319
320
321

8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012).
142 CONG. REC. 27,216 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
Id.
Id.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 34.
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valuable contributions to society . . . . Our bill returns balance to our
existing laws by allowing people with compelling or unusual
circumstances to argue their cases for reconsideration. The legislation
does not automatically waive the deportation order, it simply grants a
permanent resident alien the right to have the Attorney General
322
review the merits of his case.

Representative McCollum had been a proponent of the IIRIRA, but came to
see the detrimental impact of Congress’s proportionality conclusions.323
Representative Conyers of Michigan also sponsored the Restoration of
Fairness in Immigration Law Act of 2000 to mitigate the impacts of the
IIRIRA.324 The bill redefined crimes involving “moral turpitude, aggravated
felonies, and the definition of conviction to limit deportation to the most
serious crimes” and granted immigration judges discretion to prevent the
deportation of certain noncitizens when their deportation would result in
extreme hardship to U.S. citizen or LPR family members.325 Representative
Conyers explained that the bill “restores fairness to the immigration process by
making sure that each person has a chance to have their case heard by a fair
and impartial decision maker. No one here is looking to give immigrants a free
ride, just a fair chance.”326 That same year Senator Kennedy sponsored a bill
that similarly redefined deportable criminal offenses and increased access to
cancellation of removal.327 The bill specifically stated that existing
immigration laws “punish legal residents out of proportion to their crimes.”328
None of these proposals have been enacted. The factors that facilitated the

322 See id. at 35 (alteration in original) (quoting statement by Representative Bill McCollum to the House
of Representatives, Oct. 4, 1999).
323 Id. at 34.
324 H.R. 4966, 106th Cong. (2000).
325 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 35–36.
326 See id. at 36 (quoting Press Release, Congressman John Conyers, Jr., Conyers Re-Introduces the
Omnibus “Fix ‘96’ Immigration Bill” (Mar. 7, 2002)).
327 Immigrant Fairness Restoration Act of 2000, S. 3120, 106th Cong. (2000).
328 Id. § 2. Additional attempts to provide for more individualized proportionality review include a bill
sponsored by “Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York . . . [that] would have made non-citizens
convicted of an aggravated felony with a sentence of less than five years [in prison] eligible for cancellation of
removal.” See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 36. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont attempted to
provide noncitizen veterans additional review by making them eligible for cancellation of removal regardless
of any criminal convictions. See Fairness to Immigrant Veterans Act of 1999, S. 871, 106th Cong. § 3(a)
(1999). In 2006, Representative José Serrano of New York introduced the Citizen Child Protection Act, which
would authorize immigration judges to consider the best interests of U.S. citizen children in deportation cases.
H.R. 1176, 110th Cong. (2007).
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enactment of the 1996 reforms continue to prevail and prevent reforms that
would reevaluate the 1996 proportionality conclusions.329
The potential for disproportionate deportation decisions increases when the
variation within the immigrant community is ignored. Important variations
include immigration status, length of residence, connections to the polity, and
seriousness of criminal activity. In 1917 this variation was acknowledged and
the crime-based deportation regime took these factors into account in defining
deportable crimes and by allowing individualized deportation decisions to be
made. By 1996 this variation was largely ignored. The narrow focus on
unauthorized migrants and violent drug crimes led to the enactment of a crimebased deportation regime that fails to allow for a different proportionality
analysis for long-term LPRs with minor criminal convictions who are deeply
connected to U.S. communities.
V. THE CITIZENSHIP PROXY
Citizenship is a reasonable proxy for determining who has the requisite
connections to make deportation disproportionate, but this proxy can be both
under- and over-inclusive. Use of this proxy causes LPRs’ liberty interest in
remaining in the United States to be inadequately protected. Section A details
the ways in which citizenship status is an imperfect proxy and section B offers
an alternative framework for identifying members based on the jus nexi
principle.
A. An Imperfect Proxy
Naturalization requirements reflect one conception of which foreign-born
residents are sufficiently connected and committed to be members of the
American polity. In order to naturalize, an individual must be 1) eighteen years
old; 2) a green card holder who has resided in the United States continuously
for five years;330 3) “a person of good moral character, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the
good order and happiness of the United States”; 4) able to read, write and
speak English; and 5) knowledgeable about U.S. history and government.331
Satisfying these requirements signals that the individual “is in fact more
329

See supra text accompanying notes 289–91.
The residency requirement is only three years if the individual is the spouse of a U.S. citizen. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1430 (2012).
331 Id. § 1427; accord 8 C.F.R. §§ 312.1–.2 (2012).
330
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closely connected with the population of the [United] State[s] . . . than with
[the population] of any other State.”332
The jus nexi principle is operationalized through length of residence
requirements. Longer periods of residence allow for the development of
connections that enable one to become part of a state’s social, cultural, and
economic communities. Relevant connections include employment, family,
friends, community involvement, and property ownership. Through these
connections individuals have the opportunity to learn about the nation’s
fundamental principles and values and to accept and adhere to them. In 1790
Congress concluded that two years was a sufficient time period to establish
such connections, but in 1795 concluded that five years was necessary to
facilitate sufficient acculturation to American values.333 Length of residence is
a commonly used proxy for attachment. Since 1802 the United States has
generally considered five years the length of time within which one develops a
genuine connection and is entitled to citizenship.
Naturalization is undoubtedly a proxy for commitment to the State.
Naturalized citizens take an oath to renounce foreign allegiances, to support
and defend the United States Constitution and laws, and to “perform work of
national importance under civilian direction when required by the law.”334 This
oath marks the most significant difference between green card holders and
naturalized citizens. In deciding to become a United States citizen, an
individual is publicly demonstrating allegiance and commitment to the United
States. Yet individuals can have multiple allegiances, and this is acknowledged

332 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6) (referring to the relationship between the
State of citizenship and all other States).
333 Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414; Karin Scherner-Kim, Note, The Role of the
Oath of Renunciation in Current U.S. Nationality Policy—to Enforce, to Omit, or Maybe to Change, 88 GEO.
L.J. 329, 338–39 (2000).
With a brief exception between 1798 and 1802, the residence requirement for naturalization has
remained five years in most cases. The residency requirements were changed as part of the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798. The Naturalization Act of 1798 drastically increased the residency requirement to fourteen years.
Scholars have argued that domestic political concerns led Congress to limit noncitizens’ access to citizenship
in order to limit their participation in the electorate. See KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 54. One exception to
the five-year requirement is for spouses of U.S. citizens, who have a three-year residence requirement. 8
U.S.C. § 1430(a).
334 Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=
facd6db8d7e37210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=dd7ffe9dd4aa3210VgnVCM100000b92
ca60aRCRD (last visited June 18, 2013).
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through the practical acceptance of dual citizenship.335 Thus, deciding to
naturalize may not indicate superior loyalty or allegiance to the United States.
Citizenship status is an under-inclusive proxy for membership in the polity.
Noncitizens can have a variety of family and community relationships that
connect them to American social, cultural, and economic communities.
Commitment to the American polity can be seen when green card holders
serve in the armed forces, engage in service work to improve their
communities, or work for the U.S. government. The commitment of members
of the armed forces and those who work for U.S. federal judges can be seen in
the oath that they take to uphold and defend the U.S. Constitution. The
extension of voting rights to noncitizens, historically and today, recognizes the
under-inclusiveness of citizenship status as the basis for identifying members
of the polity.336
Citizenship can also be over-inclusive. Individuals born in the United
States but raised outside of its borders may have very few connections or
commitments to the United States.337 Their socialization outside of the United
335 The United States permits dual citizenship and does not limit the right to remain of dual citizens. See
SPIRO, supra note 16, at 59–60, 67–75. Dual citizenship is permitted for birthright citizens who may also have
birthright citizenship in another country based on jus sanguinis principles. While naturalized citizens are
required to renounce prior citizenships, in practice the U.S. government rarely takes action against naturalized
citizens who retain their initial citizenship. Irene Bloemraad, Research Note, The North American
Naturalization Gap: An Institutional Approach to Citizenship Acquisition in the United States and Canada, 36
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 193, 204 (2002). Additionally, it is difficult for naturalized citizens to have their
citizenship involuntarily revoked, but it can occur if the applicant obtained citizenship illegally, concealed a
material fact, or engaged in willful misrepresentation. 8 U.S.C. § 1451; Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122, 125 (1943).
In allowing dual citizenship, the United States extends the right to remain to individuals who may have
significant connections, commitment, and obligations to a foreign country. For these individuals, multiple
allegiances do not preclude them from enjoying the right to remain. The same should be true for green card
holders. To the extent that they can demonstrate the social fact of membership within the American polity, the
potential for multiple allegiances should not deny them the right to remain in the United States after a criminal
conviction. The fact of multiple allegiances should, however, be considered in the proportionality analysis to
determine whether deportation would be an impermissible infringement of liberty. The European Court of
Human Rights has considered a noncitizen’s connections to his or her country of nationality in determining
whether his or her right to family life has been violated. Banks, supra note 58, at 527–30.
336 See Song, supra note 136, at 608; see also Aylsworth, supra note 136, at 114 (demonstrating that
noncitizens historically were able to vote in the United States). Since 2006, noncitizens have been allowed to
vote in school board elections in Chicago and in local elections in six cities in Maryland. See Song, supra note
136, at 608. Noncitizens were also able to vote in school board elections in New York City from 1970 until
2003. Id.
337 See Jennifer Medina, Arriving as Pregnant Tourists, Leaving with American Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2011, at A1 (discussing the increasing number of foreign women who travel to the United States to deliver
their children and then depart with them).
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States could limit their ability to connect significantly to the United States.
Yet, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, these individuals are citizens
entitled to all of the rights and protections associated with citizenship,
including the right to remain.338 As a theoretical matter, my arguments could
be used to suggest that citizens should, in some circumstances, have their
rights to remain curtailed. Adopting a regime in which every individual’s right
to remain is subjected to an inquiry to determine their connections,
commitment, and obligations to the United States would require significant
government resources to administer. I do not believe that the cost of such a
system would be justified because the majority of citizens would satisfy the
connections, commitment, and obligations standard.339 The same, however,
cannot be said about LPRs. A significant number of these individuals will
similarly satisfy the connections, commitment, and obligations standard. The
additional administrative costs involved in gathering this information during
the deportation process would be justified to ensure that the liberty interests of
these residents are protected.
Gerardo and Antoinette’s stories from the introduction highlight the ways
in which citizenship can be both an under- and over-inclusive proxy for
connection and commitment to the United States. Gerardo arrived in the
United States as a young child and as an LPR with his mother and five siblings
to join his father.340 After being in the United States for twenty years, Gerardo
was convicted for selling a ten dollar bag of marijuana to a police informant.341
After living in the United States for twenty-nine years, being gainfully
employed, married to a U.S. citizen, and having U.S. citizen children, Gerardo
was deported due to his criminal conviction.342
Antoinette was born in the United States but raised in England since the
age of two. Her entire family lives in England and Antoinette has spent no time
in the United States since her departure at age two. After returning to the
United States at the age of twenty-five to pursue graduate studies in the United
States, if Antoinette sold a ten dollar bag of marijuana she would not be at risk
338

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
There has been a lot of national media attention given to stories of noncitizen women travelling to the
United States to give birth and then leaving to raise their children abroad. The government, however, does not
keep statistics on these births. See Jessica Vaughan, Birthright Citizenship Report Sparks Debate, CENTER FOR
I MMIGR . S TUD . (Apr. 7, 2011), http://cis.org/Vaughan/BirthrightCitizenshipReport. The Center for
Immigration Studies estimates the figure to be 200,000 a year. See id.
340 See McDonnell, supra note 1.
341 See id.
342 See id.
339
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of being deported to England. She would only be subject to a criminal
sentence.343 Gerardo is arguably more connected and committed to the United
States than Antoinette, yet Antoinette is the one with the right to remain.
One of Gerardo’s regrets was not naturalizing.344 Had he naturalized and
become a U.S. citizen, his fate would have been the same as Antoinette’s.
Gerardo did not explain why he did not naturalize, but a variety of
explanations have been offered in the social science literature.345 These
explanations focus on the individual skills and resources of the immigrant,
regulatory or bureaucratic barriers to naturalization, the relative costs and
benefits of naturalizing, and government reception.346 These explanations
consider a wide variety of factors, but none of them contend that the failure to
naturalize results from weak connections or a fragile commitment to the United
States.347 Rather, these theories highlight that the failure to naturalize is often
related to insufficient knowledge about the benefits of being a citizen or the
legal detriments of being a noncitizen.348
343

See BOSNIAK, supra note 16, at 71.
See id.
345 See GUILLERMINA JASSO & MARK R. ROSENZWEIG, THE NEW CHOSEN PEOPLE: IMMIGRANTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 109–21 (1990) (explaining that the likelihood of naturalizing turns on balancing the costs and
benefits of doing so); MICHAEL JONES-CORREA, BETWEEN TWO NATIONS: THE POLITICAL PREDICAMENT OF
LATINOS IN NEW YORK CITY 69–106 (1998) (examining the costs that immigrants face in an effort to explain
why their decisions to naturalize are difficult to make); SCHUCK, supra note 17, at 163–75 (contending that a
changing meaning of American citizenship has minimized the incentive to naturalize); Irene Bloemraad,
Citizenship Lessons from the Past: The Contours of Immigrant Naturalization in the Early 20th Century, 87
SOC. SCI. Q. 927, 928 (2006) [hereinafter Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past]; Louis DeSipio,
Building America, One Person at a Time: Naturalization and Political Behavior of the Naturalized in
Contemporary American Politics, in E PLURIBUS UNUM? CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION 67, 71–80 (Gary Gerstle & John Mollenkopf eds., 2001) (discussing
incentives to naturalize); Alejandro Portes & Rafael Mozo, The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and
Other Ethnic Minorities in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis, 19 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 35, 40–41
(1985) (explaining that whether immigrants naturalize in their host countries depends upon their political
motivations and proximity to their native countries). See generally IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN:
INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2006) (arguing that social
networks and a government’s attitude toward immigrants affect whether they naturalize); Robert R. Alvarez, A
Profile of the Citizenship Process Among Hispanics in the United States, 21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 327
(1987) (discussing a holistic approach to determining whether an immigrant will choose to naturalize); Irene
Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured Mobilization and Immigrant
Political Incorporation, 85 SOC. FORCES 667 (2006) (advocating an alternative model of citizenship—
structured mobilization—that focuses upon social networks and a government’s policies, to explain whether
immigrants naturalize); Philip Q. Yang, Explaining Immigrant Naturalization, 28 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 449
(1994) (proposing a broad framework to explain whether immigrants naturalize, which includes their
individual characteristics and larger social contexts).
346 See supra note 345.
347 See, e.g., Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the Past, supra note 345.
348 See id.
344
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Citizenship status can be both an under- and over-inclusive proxy for
membership in the American polity. Numerous noncitizens have deep,
significant connections, commitment, and obligations to the United States.
These connections, commitment, and obligations establish bonds that cause the
noncitizens to be “more closely connected” to the United States than any other
State.349 Creating a just deportation regime requires recognizing an
individual’s membership within the American polity. The following section
outlines an approach for achieving this goal.
B. Alternatives to the Citizenship Proxy
Citizenship as a proxy for membership is easier to administer than
examining a noncitizen’s various connections to the United States. Requiring a
multifaceted review for every deportable noncitizen would require a significant
amount of additional resources. Relying on citizenship status uses fewer
human and financial resources and limits opportunities for inconsistent
decisions. But there is a middle ground that uses categories other than
citizenship status as proxies for connections. Rather than making the right to
remain depend on citizenship status, the system could grant the right to remain
to categories of noncitizens based on immigration status, length of residence,
family ties, military service, or other factors that accurately reflect connections.
Complex, rule-like directives could be used to achieve this goal. Congress
could create a system like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that takes account
of a variety of factors in determining an individual’s punishment.350 Congress
could amend the INA to condition deportation on age, length of residence
within the country, or family status. For example, a noncitizen would be
deportable if convicted of an aggravated felony unless the individual has
continuously resided in the United States for at least ten years, or unless the
noncitizen is the spouse or parent of a U.S. citizen or LPR. Complex rules
could also be used to deal with the seriousness of the criminal-activity prong as
well. The earlier definitions of an aggravated felony required serving a

349

See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).
The use of sentencing guidelines has been critiqued for limiting the discretion of judges and requiring
unnecessarily harsh sentences. See generally Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and
the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008) (discussing the debates regarding the history of
discretion); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) (discussing the debates regarding the
history of discretion). This critique speaks to the difficulty of abstract proportionality analyses, but it also
illustrates what types of rules are enacted when a wide variety of crimes are deemed serious. See Stith, supra,
at 1453.
350
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sentence of at least five years imprisonment.351 This is one way to distinguish
between crimes where the seriousness can vary. For example, theft could be
receipt of stolen property worth $500 or $20,000. Length of sentence would
help to distinguish these cases.
This approach to membership and proportionality would require Congress
to investigate and deliberate two issues. First, what connections create the
social fact of membership such that deportation could be disproportionate?
Second, what crimes are serious enough to warrant deportation despite these
connections? These questions were explicitly discussed during the debates and
deliberations for the 1917 Immigration Act, but they were less central for the
1996 immigration reforms. Explicitly addressing these questions would allow
Congress to decide who is sufficiently connected to the United States to have a
heightened liberty interest in remaining in the United States and when
deportation is a proportionate response to specific criminal activity.
The current approach to crime-based deportation relies on a distinction
between citizens and noncitizens that is often incorrect. When the same or a
similar level of connection exists for noncitizens and citizens, we should be
able to implement a deportation system that extends the right to remain to
those with the requisite connections rather than only to those with the proxy of
the connections.352
C. Implications of Abandoning the Citizenship Proxy
The argument I have offered would limit the State’s ability to deport
noncitizens. One implication of this approach is that the requirements for
admission to the United States could increase. For example, in light of a
reduced ability to deport, the government may seek greater assurances that
LPRs are unlikely to commit crimes. This could lead to greater background
checks to obtain a green card. Noncitizens currently seeking entry to the
United States as an LPR undergo an extensive background check to ensure that
they do not fall within one of the various crime-based or national-securitybased inadmissibility grounds.353 The use of FBI name checks, FBI fingerprint
checks, and Interagency Border Inspection Services checks has led to

351

See Morawetz, supra note 26, at 1955.
See generally SPIRO, supra note 16 (discussing the ways in which citizenship can be an under- and
over-inclusive tool for identifying members of a national community).
353 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012).
352
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significant delays in the processing of visa applications.354 While additional
background checks may provide additional information that would limit the
admission of future criminals, government officials would have to deem the
cost of obtaining that information less than the financial and security costs of
noncitizen crime. Gathering additional information for all visa applicants
would potentially be significantly more expensive than the costs associated
with noncitizen crime.355
An additional implication of my approach to the right to remain is that
individuals who have engaged in violent crimes may remain in the United
States. This poses less of a concern because the United States has a system for
addressing these kinds of threats to public safety—the criminal justice system.
My argument does not limit the criminal justice system’s ability to punish
noncitizens to the full extent of the law. I do, however, recognize that states
within the United States feel as though they are unable to bear the fiscal burden
of noncitizen crime.356 The proportionality principle provides a useful tool for
balancing these concerns.357
CONCLUSION
Deportation is a legitimate tool for enforcing U.S. immigration law, but the
use of this tool for post-entry criminal activity can be disproportionate.
Proportionality is a foundational principle in American criminal and civil law,
which dictates that punitive measures should be proportionate to the
wrongdoing. The deportation of LPRs for minor criminal activity raises serious
354 See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Questions & Answers: Background Check Policy Update,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/NameCheckQA_
28Feb08.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Questions & Answers]; U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., Fact Sheet: Immigration Security Checks—How and Why the Process Works, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/security_checks_
42506.pdf. In 2008, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services allowed applications to be processed that
were waiting on the FBI name check, but had passed the other checks. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs., Questions & Answers, supra.
355 See supra text accompanying notes 234–39 for a discussion of noncitizen crime rates.
356 See, e.g., Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 126 (noting that, as of 1994, the United States
had been spending $723 million per year on unauthorized migrant prisoners); H.R. REP. NO. 104-22, at 9
(1995). With respect to states in particular, Nevada spent $3.5 million incarcerating “criminal aliens.” See
Criminal Aliens Hearing, supra note 204, at 128. Los Angeles County spent $75 million “on deportable
criminal aliens on incarceration and prosecution,” and California was expected to pay more than $375 million
in the 1994–1995 fiscal year to incarcerate unauthorized migrant criminals. See id. at 133. The Governor of
New York estimated spending $63 million to incarcerate unauthorized migrants, and Florida estimated its costs
at $58.6 million. See id. at 150.
357 See supra Part III.A.
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questions about the proportionality of the U.S. deportation regime. Pursuant to
the jus nexi principle, LPRs can be members of our polity based on their
connections to our social, cultural, and economic communities. As members of
the polity, deportation can be a significant infringement of their liberty interest
in remaining in the United States. Protecting these interests requires delinking
the right to remain from citizenship status. Citizenship status is an underinclusive proxy for the connections, commitment, and obligations that are
relevant for determining when deportation is disproportionate and thus
illegitimate. Some immigration and citizenship scholars seek to protect
immigrants’ rights by increasing immigrant access to citizenship and
encouraging naturalization. I have taken a different approach and argued for
decoupling the right to remain and citizenship status. The increased coupling
of citizenship status and the right to remain has created more distinctions
between similarly situated persons and a less egalitarian society.
In 1917 Congress recognized the significant hardship that families could
experience if a long-term resident were deported.358 By 1996 Congress had a
different understanding of immigrants and crime, and thus a different
conclusion about when crime-based deportation would be disproportionate.
The predominant narrative in the late 1980s and early 1990s was simplistic and
inaccurate. The focus was on unauthorized migrants involved in drug
trafficking and the violent crimes that accompany it. This narrative allowed
Congress to conclude that deportation was a proportionate consequence. Yet
this analysis was extended beyond drug trafficking and related violent crimes.
The aggravated felony definition was expanded with little discussion about the
actual seriousness of the new crimes. This has created a system in which
individuals like Gerardo can be deported for selling a ten dollar bag of
marijuana. While the criminal justice system did not view his crime as serious
enough to warrant a prison sentence, he was deported.359 The fact that he had
lawfully resided in the United States for over twenty years and his wife and

358 See, e.g., supra Part II.B. The narrative about immigrants and crime was complex. Immigrants were
described as being long-term residents and recent arrivals, family men and confirmed bachelors, contributing
members of society who made a mistake and opportunistic criminals, future citizens and perpetual outsiders.
This narrative allowed members of Congress to conclude that a one-size-fits-all deportation regime would be
inappropriate. Congress was also concerned with protecting public safety from the crime being committed by
immigrants. These competing concerns were balanced by providing statutes of limitations and individualized
proportionality reviews. This approach to balancing individual hardship and protecting public safety lasted
until 1996. See supra Part III.
359 Gerardo was sentenced to only ninety days in jail. See McDonnell, supra note 1.
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children were U.S. citizens could not be taken into account when deciding if he
would be deported.
Some members of Congress recognize the harshness of our current
deportation regime. They have sponsored legislation that would allow
immigrants’ connections to be considered when deportation decisions are
made. The success of these efforts depends on an accurate conception of
serious threats to public safety and a new national narrative about immigrants
and crime. The new narrative must reflect the variation within the immigrant
community and resonate with American voters. These are both difficult, but
necessary, challenges to overcome in order to create a just crime-based
deportation regime.

